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The domestic terrorist threat in the United States is active and complex, with ongoing 
threats from violent left- and right-wing extremist groups, and radicalization and 
recruitment efforts by international terrorist groups. In response, domestic intelligence 
agencies, at all levels of government, have instituted reforms and improvements since 
9/11, but there are still gaps in information-sharing and community engagement. For 
example, a review of the Boston Marathon bombings uncovered that important risk-based 
information was not shared with local law enforcement. Concerning domestic terrorism, 
the United States may, once again, be failing to “connect the dots.” 
This thesis synthesizes existing studies, reports, and expert testimony concerning 
domestic terrorism and the roles of domestic intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and 
the public, and proposes the development and implementation of a formal, national 
counterterrorism (CT) doctrine. The CT doctrine, in conjunction with a counter-
radicalization strategy, should focus on bottom-up intelligence/information-sharing, 
training to strengthen and focus intelligence collection efforts, and culturally sensitive 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
Homeland security officials are concerned that the rise in domestic terrorism 
attacks may be an “early warning” that domestic radicalization is becoming more likely 
in the United States.1 A 2010 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report stated that 
the threat of homegrown terrorism is growing, yet there is no coordinated effort to 
identify and address the factors influencing domestic radicalization. There are no 
established goals, nor is there a designated agency or combination of agencies to take the 
lead in classifying the origins of radicalization, identifying trends, and taking the steps 
necessary to prevent or mitigate the issue. This rise in radicalization may have directly 
impacted domestic terrorism threats and opportunities in America and key law 
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), state fusion centers, and local law enforcement may not be 
focusing on the true nature and breadth of these threats. With regard to intelligence, 
terrorism expert Brian Jenkins states that “preventing future terrorist attacks requires 
effective domestic intelligence collection that is best accomplished by local authorities.”2  
There is evidence for this concern in the current structure of the domestic 
intelligence agencies. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
oversees the Intelligence Community (IC), which primarily focuses on foreign 
intelligence and threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Only a select few 
federal agencies, within the IC, focus exclusively on domestic terrorism. The FBI is this 
country’s domestic intelligence agency responsible for handling domestic terrorism, but 
the FBI does not report to the ODNI. The state-level intelligence agencies are fusion 
centers, initially established to share terrorist-related information among state, local, 
tribal, and federal law enforcement. However, many of the 70+ fusion centers have 
1 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Violent Islamist 
Extremism, The Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat (Washington, DC: United States Senate, 
2008), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf?attempt=2, 4. 
2 Jerome Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating A Complex Threat (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2013), 46. 
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expanded their roles to include all hazards and/or all crimes. This expanded role of fusion 
centers may be diluting their effectiveness in dealing with domestic terrorism because 
their focus has been diverted to other crimes and emergencies. 
National intelligence estimates (NIEs), produced by the ODNI, are considered the 
“gold standard” of intelligence assessments. According to Zegart, “NIEs are supposed to 
give the best, big picture understanding of the whole Intelligence Community on a vital 
problem laden with serious uncertainties.”3 They are long-term estimates on the likely 
direction taken by a potential issue or threat. The most recent NIE, entitled, The Terrorist 
Threat to the U.S. Homeland, was issued by the National Intelligence Council in July 
2007 and claimed that “[t]he main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, 
especially al-Qa’ida.”4 There was a brief and insignificant statement about non-Muslim 
domestic threats:  
We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often referred to as 
“single-issue” groups by the FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the 
next three years given their violent histories, but we assess this violence is 
likely to be on a small scale.5  
Until September 2012, no other domestic terrorism NIEs or intelligence reports 
encompassing all potential terrorist groups had been produced since 2007.  
A January 2009 report by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 
states that left-wing extremism activities, particularly cybercrime, will increase over the 
next decade.6 In addition, an April 2009 DHS I&A report on domestic right-wing 
extremism warns of increasing recruitment and radicalization.7 In July 2014, a DHS I&A 
3 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 85. 
4 National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. 
Homeland (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2007), 6. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Leftwing Extremists 
Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009), accessed October 25, 2010, http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/leftwing.pdf  
7 Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Rightwing 
Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and 
Recruitment (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009), accessed October 25, 2010, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf  
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intelligence assessment highlighted the growing threat to government officials and law 
enforcement from anti-government extremists, such as militias and Sovereign Citizens.8 
As described in this recent DHS I&A assessment, the trend continues to show a rise in 
the domestic terrorism threat by non-Islamic domestic terrorist groups. A 2010 Time 
magazine cover story gave a detailed account of “The Secret World of Extreme Militias” 
and concerns about the rise in armed anti-government extremist groups.9 An October 
2010 Institute for Homeland Security Solutions report looked at domestic terrorist plots 
over the past decade by groups with all types of ideological philosophies. The report 
urges homeland security officials to: 
Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do 
not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by “lone 
wolves.” Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, 
and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or 
anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways.10  
A 2011 document from the White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
strengthens the national security and counterterrorism messages voiced in earlier White 
House documents by proposing a strategy with which the federal government will 
support and empower communities and local partners to help prevent violent 
extremism.11 This philosophy supports the recommendations made in several research 
reports and studies, and mentioned in this thesis, in which local law enforcement and the 
American public are named as key players in combating domestic terrorism. However, 
there is not a clear plan for how this will be accomplished, what planning and training 
resources are and will be available, and whether or not declining federal grant funds will 
be assessed and made available specifically for this endeavor. 
8 Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Domestic Violent 
Extremists Pose Increased Threat to Government Officials and Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
9 Barton Gellman, “The Secret World of Extreme Militias,” Time, September 30, 2010. 
10 Kevin Strom et al., Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. 
Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009 (Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010). 
11 The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011). 
3 
                                                 
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) produces an annual report on the 
number of active hate and extremist groups in the U.S. The SPLC’s most recent report 
claims that although the number of groups declined in 2013,12 the Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL) expressed concern that violence by domestic extremists, particularly 
against law enforcement, is rising.13 
Weighing the consequences of sacrificing civil liberties and privacy against 
protecting the safety of the country is an ongoing debate when addressing domestic 
terrorism. Federal, state, and local domestic intelligence agencies continually proclaim 
their commitment to preserving citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties while completing 
their mission of counterterrorism and national security. However, the American Civil 
Liberties Union is one of many agencies contending that civil liberties continue to be 
violated by domestic intelligence agencies with the collection, dissemination, and 
investigation of questionable information and “suspicious” activities of the American 
public.14 Surprisingly, recent polls indicate that adults nationwide are more concerned 
that national anti-terrorism policies have not done enough to protect our country, with 
lesser concern about the restrictions on civil liberties.15 A true balance is needed to 
properly address domestic terrorism and preserve citizens’ fundamental rights. 
The intelligence collection and analysis process is a critical piece in combating 
domestic terrorism. In fact, the 9/11 Commission expressed concern that the IC had not 
produced a comprehensive intelligence estimate on the terrorist threat between 1997 and 
leading up to September 11, 2001.16 Even with the apparent increase in homegrown 
terrorism, an NIE on domestic terrorism has not been produced to date. However, during 
12 Mark Potok, The Year in Hate and Extremism, Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014, accessed July 
14, 2014, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2014/spring/The-
Year-in-Hate-and-Extremism 
13 Anti-Defamation League, “Officers Down: Right-Wing Extremists Attacking Police at Growing 
Rate,” Anti-Defamation League [blog], June 9, 2014http://blog.adl.org/extremism/officers-down-right-
wing-extremists-attacking-police-at-growing-rate 
14 Michael German, and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? (Washington, DC: 
American Civil Liberties Union, 2007).  
15 “Terrorism,” 2014, accessed November 27, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm  
16 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 341–342. 
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a 2012 hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-Committee on the 
Constituion, Civil Rights and Human Rights focusing on Hate Crimes and the Threat of 
Domestic Extremism, Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Michael Clancy of the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division, mentioned an unclassified, limited distribution National 
Terrorism Assessment of Domestic Terror was currently available. According to this 
assessment, “domestic extremist movements pose a medium to low terrorism threat,” and 
DAD Clancy highlighted the recent violent acts17 committed by “lone offenders and 
small cells.”18  
The problem this thesis will focus on is whether or not the emerging threat of 
domestic terrorism and the extent of the risks posed by all domestic terrorists, including 
non-Islamic extremists and lone wolves, are issues that are under-emphasized by the FBI, 
DHS, state fusion centers, and local law enforcement agencies. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will explore the domestic terrorist threat by reviewing the current 
threat level and the roles and responsibilities of key players in combating domestic 
terrorism. An action plan will be recommended based on the answers to the research 
questions listed below.  
Primary Question: If the domestic terrorist threat in the U.S. is growing, what 
changes must take place to improve the collaborative relationship between the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, state fusion centers, and 
local law enforcement to facilitate information sharing for the sake of homeland and 
national security protection?  
 
17 In 2012, the FBI dismantled an anarchist extremist cell comprised of five men who planned to blow 
up a bridge in Cleveland, Ohio. In November 2011, four members of a militia in Georgia were arrested for 
planning to acquire silencers and explosives to use against various U.S. government targets in Atlanta, 
Georgia. Three high-profile lone offender shootings in 2012—at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado; at a 
Sikh temple in Wisconsin; and at the Family Research Council headquarters in Washington, D.C.—resulted 
in the combined deaths of 18 individuals and the wounding of over 50.  
18 The Domestic Terrorism Threat, Testimony before Senate Judiciary Committee, Hate Crimes and 
the Threat of Domestic Extremism (2012) (testimony of Michael Clancy), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-domestic-terrorism-threat 
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Secondary Question: How can existing threat briefings and intelligence products 
be improved upon so they sufficiently address the evolving threats of all domestic 
terrorism groups, inform first responders and, as necessary, are transparent to the 
American public? 
C. HYPOTHESIS  
The domestic terrorist threat in the United States is growing and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, state fusion centers, and 
local law enforcement are not focused on the magnitude of this emerging issue. As a 
result, new threats from a variety of domestic terrorist groups are emerging, opportunities 
for collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence agencies are missed, and the 
public at large is denied a substantial role in potentially combating the threat.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used for this thesis will be a systematic review that 
involves synthesizing the existing studies, reports, and expert testimony to date 
concerning domestic terrorism and the roles of domestic intelligence agencies, law 
enforcement, and the public. The framework for this systematic review is a modified 
force field analysis.  
Force field analysis, developed by social psychologist Kurt Lewin, is used as a 
brainstorming tool when planning for change. In this thesis, the method is modified to 
gauge the strength and possibility of the driving forces (forces for change) relative to the 
core claims identified in this thesis. These driving forces will be measured against the 
restraining forces (forces for status quo). The driving and restraining forces will be 
compiled from the studies, reports, and testimony on the subject, and the prevailing 
driving and restraining forces will be treated as best practices in determining the extent of 
the domestic terrorism threat in the U.S. and the necessary policies for addressing the 
threat. Finally, recommendations will be developed, along with a plan for 
implementation. 
6 
In the net chapter, the literature review identifies the various studies, reports, and 
resources that describe past and current domestic terrorism incidents and the profiles of 
and threats posed by numerous domestic violent extremist groups. Many reports and 
books, especially since September 11, 2001, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 
intelligence process; the roles of local law enforcement, domestic intelligence agencies, 
and the public, in that process; and recommendations for change to improve the process. 
This chapter also notes the areas scarce or missing in the literature, such as a 
comprehensive analysis of the current and anticipated domestic terrorist threat in the U.S. 
and the recommendations for addressing the proliferation of the lone wolf or lone 
offender. 
In order to conduct a systematic review of the emerging threat of domestic 
terrorism in the U.S., the driving forces and restraining forces that characterize the 
magnitude of the threat are identified in Chapter III. The chapter first provides a 
definition of domestic terrorism and other common terms that are closely related to the 
domestic terrorism discussion. This includes a comparison between domestic terrorist 
crimes, hate crimes, and homegrown violent extremism, as well as lone wolf terrorists 
and active shooters. The chapter also outlines the evolution of domestic terrorism, 
beginning with the first recognized domestic terrorist group that was formed in 1866, the 
proliferation of right- and left-wing extremist groups, and the emergence of foreign 
terrorists in the 1990s is also outlined. The growing Sovereign Citizen movement and 
American foreign fighters for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) monopolize the 
discussion of the current scope of domestic terrorism in the U.S. 
Chapter IV provides an overview of the roles and impacts of the key federal, state, 
and local agencies responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence 
concerning domestic terrorism: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of 
Homeland Security, state fusion centers, and local law enforcement. It also describes the 
current structure and focus of the domestic intelligence enterprise. There is also a 
discussion on the important role played by the public in the identification and prevention 
of domestic terrorism incidents through reporting of suspicious activities and actions 
taken to foil terrorist attacks. The driving forces that support changes to the current 
7 
domestic intelligence structure and more involvement from the public are compared to 
the restraining forces that promote resistance to further intrusions of privacy and civil 
liberties through enhanced intelligence collection methods and information-sharing, and 
the contention that the domestic terrorism threat is not as serious as it appears. 
Chapter V is devoted to the analysis of the strength of each of the driving and 
restraining forces identified in earlier chapters; the results of which will influence 
whether or not the increasing domestic terrorism threat and related violence are at a level 
that require more robust vigilance and prevention efforts. With respect to the current 
domestic intelligence environment, the influences of key players, such as federal, state, 
and local government agencies, the public, the media, and other public and private 
entities are discussed in Chapter V.  
Based on the analysis of the driving and restraining forces concerning the growing 
domestic terrorism threat and the current collaboration and focus of domestic intelligence 
agencies, Chapter VI provides the recommendations and next steps that all levels of 
government should take to ensure the public’s continued safety from domestic terrorism, 
to actively address radicalization, and to continue to collecting and sharing pertinent 
information with the correct entities—all while protecting privacy and civil liberties. 
There are challenges to meeting these requirements, though, as there is an ongoing debate 
concerning how much the public should know about terrorism threats and when. Also, 
can the country be adequately protected from domestic terrorism without surrendering 
privacy and restricting civil liberties? These issues should be in the forefront of ongoing 
research, along with the continued examination of the unpredictable lone wolf offender 
and an evaluation of the effectiveness and impacts of a central activity in the domestic 
terrorism fight: the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). 
This chapter has focused on the major domestic terrorism issues faced by federal, 
state, and local homeland security officials today in assessing and tackling the evolving 
threat. As stated above, this thesis will focus on identifying the scope of the current threat 
and outlining the strategy and roles of federal, state, and local domestic intelligence 
agencies, as well as the public, in addressing the threat. The next chapter is the literature 
review and will identify available resources that document the current threats, profile key 
8 
players in prevention and mitigation of the threats, and highlight the common 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
10 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the documents that support or refute the claims 
made in the research questions and in response to the issues identified in the problem 
statement. The review includes books on terrorism and intelligence; government 
documents, including Congressional testimony and reports; research reports and studies; 
and journal articles and non-print media concerning this country’s domestic terror threat, 
and the status of domestic intelligence efforts made by domestic intelligence agencies and 
law enforcement agencies. A review of the literature indicates that the focus on foreign 
terrorist threats, and less on domestic terrorist groups, may be short-sighted. Overall, the 
“lone wolf” has emerged in the literature as the most successful perpetrator of terrorist 
acts and a great concern for law enforcement. An additional danger for law enforcement 
is the increasing violence perpetrated by anti-government extremist groups, especially 
anti-police groups. The recent threat by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also 
made headlines, as ISIS has used social media to urge lone wolf attacks against 
Westerners. 
A. DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT 
The amount of literature on the evolving threats from domestic terrorism has 
increased over the past few years with the surge in high profile violent acts perpetrated by 
anti-government groups and individuals, increasing attacks by active shooters, and the 
discernible threat from foreign fighters. The domestic terrorist threat can be from 
Americans who have United States-based extremist ideologies or those in the U.S. who 
are inspired by international terrorist organizations. 
The New America Foundation website (http://newamerica.org/) contains multiple 
databases on homegrown violent extremism in the U.S., particularly the number and type 
of terrorist plots and how they were discovered, the number of deaths related to violent 
extremist attacks, and the total number of Jihadist and non-Jihadist extremists identified 
since 2001. Its databases are up-to-date, as of October 2014. The purpose of the databases 
is “to provide as much information as possible about American citizens and permanent 
11 
residents engaged in violent extremist activity as well as individuals, regardless of their 
citizenship status, living within the United States who have engaged in violent extremist 
activity.”19 This includes those motivated by jihadist ideology and those motivated by 
other non-jihadist ideologies, such as right-wing, left-wing, or other radical groups.20 
A notable domestic terrorist group is known as Sovereign Citizens and is 
recognized as a “top concern” among law enforcement.21 On May 15, 2011, a 60 Minutes 
story, “A Look at the ‘Sovereign Citizen’ Movement,” “introduced” the Sovereign 
Citizens, “an Internet-based anti-government group that the FBI lists among the top ten 
domestic terror threats facing the United States.”22 Journalist Byron Pitts begins the piece 
by stating that it is about “a group of Americans you’ve likely never heard of” although 
their size is estimated to be over 300,000 members.”23 This is not a newly formed group; 
the Sovereign Citizen interviewed for the piece has been a member of the movement for 
over 28 years. The subject matter expert and law enforcement officials interviewed 
voiced concerns about the growing violence of the Sovereign Citizens, especially against 
law enforcement and judges. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Southern 
Poverty Law Center websites both highlight the Sovereign Citizens among other known 
domestic terrorist or hate groups of today.  
An FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin highlights the evolving nature of terrorism 
since September 11, 2001 (9/11) and warns that the “violent extremist threat is not 
limited to those with Islamist ideology” as it takes a close look at the motivations and 
activities of Sovereign Citizens.24 In a 2006 speech, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller 
expressed concern about the homegrown terrorism threat and stated that the FBI was 
19 New America’s International Security Program, “Homegrown Extremism 2001–2014,” 2014, New 
America Foundation, accessed November 2, 2014, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/analysis 
20 Ibid.  
21 David Carter et al., Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes (College Park, MD: 
START, 2014). 
22 Byron Pitts, “A Look at the ‘Sovereign Citizen’ Movement,” 60 Minutes, May 5, 2011. 
23 Ibid. 
24 John E. Ott, “Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin (September 2011), http://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/sovereign-citizens-a-growing-
domestic-threat-to-law-enforcement 
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looking at “hundreds” of individuals in the country.25 The FBI website contains copies of 
testimony made by its various senior staff over the years regarding the threat from 
domestic extremist movements. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most recent 
testimony on the subject was that of FBI Deputy Assistant Director Michael Clancy, 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Human Rights in September 2012, when he stated that domestic extremists pose a 
“medium to low” terrorism threat.26 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, American Jihadist Terrorism: 
Combating a Complex Threat, highlights the escalation in Islamic jihadist plots in the 
U.S. between May 2009 and December 2012, with the discovery of 63 “homegrown,” 
jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the 
U.S., two of which were successful. From 9/11 through May 2009, however, there were 
only 21 plots, two of which were successful.27 All four of the successful homegrown 
jihadist attacks were perpetrated by lone wolves.28  
In 2010, the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS) studied open 
source evidence of foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets for the period 
from 1999 through 2009 in its report entitled Building on Clues: Examining Successes 
and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009. IHSS looked at groups with 
all types of ideological philosophies, not just al-Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM). 
This study supported other studies’ concerns about the proliferation of lone wolves and 
recommended that both the public and local law enforcement are instrumental in the 
prevention of and the war against domestic terrorism.29 The research uncovered 86 cases; 
25 Associated Press, “FBI Director: Homegrown Terror Threat Rises,” MSNBC, September 7, 2006, 
accessed October 22, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14715980/%5Benter%20URL%5D  
26 The Domestic Terrorism Threat (testimony of Michael Clancy).  
27 Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. 
28 The four successful homegrown jihadist attacks included Nidal Malik Hasan, Fort Hood, Texas 
Shooting, November 5, 2009, 13 killed and 43 wounded; Abulhakim Muhammad, Shooting at the Little 
Rock, Arkansas Military Recruiting Center, June 1, 2009, one killed and one wounded; Hasan Akbar, 
Attack on Soldiers at U.S. Army Post in Kuwait, March 23, 2003, two killed and 14 wounded; and 
Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, Attempted Vehicular Murder at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, March 3, 2006, nine injured. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.  
29 Strom et al., Building on Clues. 
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40 out of the 86 involved Islamic extremists, and non-Islamic extremists were responsible 
for 32 out of the 86 cases. Interestingly, the non-Islamic extremist groups were more 
successful in executing their attacks than Islamic-extremist groups. Also, lone wolves 
were more successful than small and large groups, with an execution rate of 30 percent 
versus 16 percent for small and large groups combined.30   
According to a September 2010 report, Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report 
of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group, the U.S. is 
“stumbling blindly through the legal, operational, and organizational minefield of 
countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment occurring in the United States.”31 The 
report further describes al-Qaeda’s diversity strategy in the homeland. That is, al-Qaeda 
is recruiting and training a variety of ethnically diverse individuals, within the U.S., to 
conspire against the homeland. This strategy is to prevent law enforcement from 
developing a profile of the radicalized individuals. This report and similar reports on the 
growing radicalization in the U.S. recommend that the best chances for responding to the 
“dynamic and diversified” domestic terrorism threat is to engage state and local law 
enforcement and public safety officials, as well as the general public. However, this 
strategy is not being executed.  
The above mentioned report by the Bipartisan Policy Center was updated in 2013, 
Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment. In this report, the new trend that is evident 
from international terrorist groups was clear: “the threat from jihadist violence has shifted 
away from plots directly connected to foreign groups to plots by individuals who are 
merely inspired by them.”32 They cite the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings as an 
example of the dangers of “disaffected individuals influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology.”33 
In that case, it appears that key information was not shared by federal entities with local 
law enforcement. In retrospect, this information may have assisted local law enforcement 
30 Ibid. 
31 Peter Bergen, and Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010), 30. 
32 Peter Bergen et al., Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy 
Center, 2013). 
33 Ibid., 5. 
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in assessing the risks posed by the alleged perpetrators. Increased information-sharing 
from federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies to state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies is the top recommendation resulting from an investigation, by the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, of the response to and the aftermath of the 
Boston Marathon bombings.34 As explained in the 2014 Congressional report, The Road 
to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings, 
increased information-sharing translates into greater resources for the FBI and Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), as the hundreds of thousands of state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement officers may now act as the eyes and ears of federal law enforcement.35  
The emerging threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is 
currently a common topic in Congressional hearings and briefings. The RAND 
Corporation published disturbing statistics concerning ISIS and their growing influence 
on American foreign fighters. The information is based on counterterrorism expert Seth 
Jones’ testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence on July 24, 2014 concerning Jihadist Sanctuaries in 
Syria and Iraq: Implications for the United States.36 In contrast, the CRS Insights 
briefing, entitled “American Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State: Broad Challenges for 
Federal Law Enforcement,” published in September 2014, states that the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) reports that ISIS “currently poses no specific or credible threat 
to the homeland,” but there is very little documented information on Americans fighting 
for ISIS.37   
Several terrorism books have been published since 9/11, but very few are focused 
on domestic terrorism; instead the issue of foreign terrorism dominates. Inside Terrorism, 
34 Majority Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism 
Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings (Washington, DC: Homeland Security Committee, 
2014). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Jihadist Sanctuaries in Syria and Iraq: Implications for the United States, testimony before House 
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 114th Cong. (2014) 
(testimony of Seth G. Jones), http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT414.html 
37 Jerome Bjelopera, American Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State: Broad Challenges for Federal 
Law Enforcement, CRS Insights (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/index.html 
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by Bruce Hoffman, is the go-to book on terrorism. Hoffman discusses the motivations 
and origins of both al-Qaeda and domestic, non-Islamic terrorist groups. His book is a 
comprehensive look at the evolution of terrorism and the projected future of terrorism, 
particularly al-Qaeda.38 It is possible to get a fair and balanced perspective on terrorist 
threats and trends from this one source. 
The anthology book, Intelligence and National Security, contains a variety of 
essays, from 38 contributors, on the history of American intelligence, the types of 
intelligence collected, challenges faced by intelligence analysts, and the intelligence 
agencies in other countries. This document is lacking information, however, on the 
evolving nature of the domestic terrorist threat today and the ethical and legal challenges 
faced by domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies.39  
The RAND Corporation’s 2014 conference report on Identifying Enemies among 
Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence 
Collection and Information Sharing provides multiple perspectives, from various federal, 
state, and local homeland security officials, on the threat of terrorism to the U.S. and 
potential strategies for addressing the ongoing threat.40 
Several intelligence reports concerning terrorist threats have been created  and 
published by the federal agencies responsible for homeland security and 
counterterrorism. In 2009, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) published 
a series of intelligence assessments focusing on violent radicalization in the U.S. 
Although the April 2009 assessment of “Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and 
Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment” created a stir by 
concluding that returning, disgruntled military veterans may be targets for recruitment 
and radicalization by rightwing extremists, the statement that “lone wolves and small 
terrorist cells embracing violent rightwing extremist ideology are the most dangerous 
38 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
39 Loch K. Johnson, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of 
Spies: An Anthology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
40 Brian Michael Jenkins, Andrew Liepman, and Henry H. Willis, Identifying Enemies among Us: 
Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and 
Information Sharing (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2014). 
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domestic terrorism threat in the United States”41 comports with other experts’ opinions 
on the proliferation of lone wolves. This statement is supported by remarks made by FBI 
Deputy Assistant Director Michael Clancy before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights in 2012, concerning 
the findings of a recently disseminated National Terrorism Assessment on Domestic 
Terrorism.42 DHS I&A published another report in July 2014, Domestic Violent 
Extremists Pose Increased Threat to Government Officials and Law Enforcement, which 
warns against non-Islamic, anti-government extremist domestic groups and lone 
offenders.43 
In contrast to the majority of domestic terrorism studies cited above, a few high 
profile journal articles and special investigative reports by the media have focused on 
non-Islamic extremism in the U.S. These non-Islamic domestic terrorist groups are not 
usually profiled on the nightly news and may not be on the radar of most Americans.  
An exception to this trend was a 2010 Time magazine cover story on militias. The 
story gave a detailed account of “The Secret World of Extreme Militias” and highlighted 
the rise in armed and violent anti-government extremist groups. This article, too, warns of 
the danger of lone wolves, an issue that an unidentified “top” FBI counterterrorism (CT) 
official states is the FBI’s “biggest concern.”44 
A robust source for information on non-Islamic terrorist groups is the Southern 
Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) website (www.splcenter.org). The site has numerous 
profiles of domestic groups, including militias and the increasingly violent Sovereign 
Citizens.  
Very few resources exist that focus on the “lone wolf” terrorist, and the subject 
has only recently become more popular due to some high-profile, violent events 
perpetrated by lone wolves. Jeffrey D. Simon’s 2013 book on Lone Wolf Terrorism: 
41 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Rightwing Extremism, 7.  
42 The Domestic Terrorism Threat (testimony of Michael Clancy).  
43 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Domestic Violent Extremists. 
44 Gellman, “The Secret World of Extreme Militias,” 12. 
17 
                                                 
Understanding the Growing Threat tries to define lone wolf terrorism, identify major 
challenges in identifying lone wolves, and introduce some preventive and responsive 
strategies for dealing with lone wolf terrorism.45 A 2013 American Society of 
Criminology research article on loner attacks and domestic extremism, Distinguishing 
“Loner” Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right 
Homicide Incident and Offender Characteristics, makes the case for additional research 
on this topic.46 There is a strong correlation between lone wolf terrorists and active 
shooters. The FBI makes this comparison in its 2014 report, entitled A Study of Active 
Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013 when they identified 160 
active shooter incidents, of which 158 were perpetrated by a single shooter or lone 
offender.47  
Compared to many other countries, the U.S. does not face the same magnitude of 
terrorist attacks or threats on its own soil. The actual threat and the perceived threat may 
be significantly different, based on media influence, political rhetoric, and human nature. 
Any discussion on the domestic terrorist threat in the U.S. and the most effective methods 
for collecting and analyzing domestic intelligence and sharing information must take 
these factors into consideration. A variety of resources look at how fears, risk 
perceptions, and responses are not always logical. For example, Overblown: How 
Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We 
Believe Them, by John Mueller, claims that there is an “overreaction” to terrorism and 
suggests methods for reducing fear among Americans as a possible response to the 
perceived terrorist threat.48 The Science of Fear: How the Culture of Fear Manipulates 
Your Brain, by Daniel Gardner, touts fear as an outstanding “marketing tool” and claims 
45 Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2013). 
46 Jeff Gruenwald, Steven Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, “Distinguishing ‘Loner’ Attacks from 
Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender 
Characteristics” in Criminology & Public Policy 12 no. 1 (2013): 65–91.     
47 J. Pete Blair, and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States 
between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2014). 
48 John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006). 
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that government officials’ narrative and media reporting significantly influence the 
public’s perception of the actual terrorism threat.49 
B. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THEIR FOCUS ON 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) was formed and prepared a comprehensive 
report that included several recommendations for improving and reorganizing the 
Intelligence Community (IC) due to its failure to “connect the dots” with regard to the 
foreign terrorist threat. Once again, the United States may be experiencing a failure to 
“connect the dots” or identify the magnitude of the threat of domestic terrorism, 
especially with regard to the small cells or lone wolf.  
Since 9/11, literature on the issues of intelligence reliability and reform has been 
prevalent. Based on several recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission for 
improving and restructuring the American IC, there has been an emphasis in the literature 
on analyzing intelligence collection and developing an effective information-sharing 
environment within the diverse and vast world that is the IC. However, the focus of the 
literature is primarily related to foreign terrorist threats from abroad and domestic 
terrorist threats from Islamic extremist, yet non-Islamic domestic terrorist groups are not 
at the forefront. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, by Mark Lowenthal, is a 
comprehensive view of the American intelligence system, its requirements, failings, and 
challenges. The book paints a very clear picture of the enormity and range of the U.S. IC, 
a point that validates the ongoing issues concerning communication and information-
sharing in the domestic intelligence community.50 These issues are further documented in 
Transforming U.S. Intelligence51 and Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 
9/11.52 In the domestic intelligence arena, leadership and coordination are lacking among 
49 Daniel Gardner, The Science of Fear: How the Culture of Fear Manipulates Your Brain (New York: 
Penguin Group Inc., 2008). 
50 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009). 
51 Jennifer E. Sims, and Burton Gerber, Eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005). 
52 Zegart, Spying Blind. 
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
state fusion centers, and local law enforcement. Contrary to the national IC, which is 
overseen by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), these domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies are not all federal agencies and there is not a role similar to 
that of the DNI in this venue. Jerome Bjelopera, of Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), conducted a comprehensive overview of the FBI’s efforts, since 9/11, to reform 
and improve its terrorism intelligence and investigation capabilities in the report, The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations.53 Intelligence capabilities 
are reviewed and criticized in CRS’s 2011 report entitled Intelligence Issues for 
Congress.54 
Domestic intelligence issues and challenges have been highlighted over the past 
decade by the RAND Corporation. In a series of monographs, RAND’s notable reports 
are 2008’s Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options55 and 2005’s 
State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism,56 which review the roles and 
responsibilities of domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the fight against 
domestic terrorism.  
Books on intelligence are plentiful, but only a fraction of their content focuses on 
domestic terrorism in the U.S. Greta Marlatt, of the Naval Postgraduate School library, 
compiled Intelligence and Policy-Making: A Bibliography, a 131-page bibliography 
containing over 500 resources on intelligence but only a handful of the sources listed 
focus on domestic intelligence or domestic intelligence reform.57 The Chair of Ohio State 
University’s National Security Studies, John Mueller, published a compilation of case 
53 Jerome Bjelopera, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
54 Richard A. Best, Jr., Intelligence Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2011). 
55 Gregory F. Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008). 
56 K. Jack Riley, Gregory F. Treverton, Jeremy M. Wilson, and Lois M. Davis, State and Local 
Intelligence in the War on Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005). 
57 Greta Marlatt, Intelligence and Policy-Making: A Bibliography (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2011) http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research%20Tools/Bibliographies/Intelligence/intellall2010.pdf 
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studies, Terrorism Since 9/11—The American Cases, of the 33 Islamic extremist 
terrorism plots to commit violence in the U.S. from 9/11/2001 to 2011.58 He and his 
students depended upon Internet and electronic sources to complete this project, as he 
states, “the scholarly literature has focused far more detailed attention on terrorism cases 
abroad than on ones within the United States.”59  
The President of the United States released the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism in 2011. This 19-page document almost exclusively focuses on al-
Qaeda and declares this as one of the president’s top national security priorities. The 
document acknowledges that, since 9/11, “the preponderance of the United States’ CT 
effort has been aimed at preventing the recurrence of an attack on the Homeland directed 
by al-Qa’ida.”60 However, the document does encourage the country to continue to 
improve and increase its counterterrorism capabilities, including information-sharing and 
intelligence analysis and integration.61 Later that year, the White House released the 
follow-up document, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, which outlined locally-focused, 
community-based actions to keep families, communities, and local organizations 
informed and engaged in the counterterrorism efforts.62 
Although the strategies touted in the White House documents have not been fully 
implemented, there are other reports that have been published that provide more specific 
and feasible counter-radicalization actions. For example, Robert Deardorff’s 2010 Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) thesis, entitled “Countering Violent 
Extremism: The Challenge and The Opportunity,” supports strategies that offer a balance 
of hard-power and soft-power tactics to stop the influences of radical extremist groups 
and engage individuals and communities to work as co-partners in the counter-
58 John Mueller, Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 
2011). 
59 Ibid. 
60 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2011), 11. 
61 Ibid., 12. 
62 The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan. 
21 
                                                 
radicalization process.63 The National Security Preparedness Group offered its own 
recommendations for Preventing Violent Radicalization in America in 2011, primarily 
through messaging, outreach and engagement at the local level; training of governmental 
entities in those areas to enhance engagement from the local community; and 
standardized counter-radicalization information-sharing.64  
A current intelligence resource is the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reports 
Initiative, which takes locally generated intelligence and is shares it with federal, state, 
and other local jurisdictions. These reports contain local law enforcement’s observations 
of suspicious behavior, 911 calls, and other tips from the general public. A 2011 CRS 
report, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report 
Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, encourages domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies to take full advantage of this potentially effective domestic 
intelligence initiative.65  
According to the 2013 CRS report, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a 
Complex Threat, the threat of homegrown terrorism is growing, yet there is no 
coordinated effort to identify and address the factors influencing radicalization.66 The 
report cites, “[i]ntegrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national 
counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers.”67  This is a 
stinging finding for domestic intelligence agencies; one that must be corrected and has 
been corroborated by other terrorism experts and studies. In their 2010 report on 
Assessing the Terrorist Threat, Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman found it “troubling” that 
“there remains no federal government agency or department specifically charged with 
63 Robert B. Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” 
(master’s thesis, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
64 Peter Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy 
Center, 2011). 
65 Mark A. Randol, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report 
Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
66 Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. 
67 Ibid., 46. 
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identifying radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or residents for 
terrorism.”68  
The various terrorism-related strategies and reports, developed by federal 
government agencies, primarily focus on threats to the homeland from al-Qaeda, and, in 
fact, identify that as the priority for counterterrorism efforts. The National Security 
Strategy, posted in May 2010, seeks to improve security, prosperity, values, and 
international order for Americans.69 With regard to the terrorist threat, al-Qaeda is once 
again named as the main target in the nation’s attempts to prevent attacks on and in the 
homeland. However, the strategy does address homegrown radicalization, in general, and 
encourages community empowerment in the fight against radicalization because the “best 
defenses” against these threats “are well informed and equipped families, local 
communities, and institutions.”70 As such, better intelligence and expanded community 
engagement and empowerment are needed to realize success against this and other 
potentially growing threats.71 
Intelligence concerns were exposed by the Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) 
January 18, 2011 episode of Frontline, entitled “Are We Safer?,” which discussed the 
many counterterrorism improvements and technological advances in intelligence that 
have been made since 9/11.72 The report implies that the advances are intrusive to 
Americans and encourages the government and the public to weigh the advantages and/or 
disadvantages of these changes in making the country safer. This is a key concept for 
consideration and is often raised by advocacy groups and terrorism experts alike 
regarding the impact of homeland security efforts on privacy and civil liberties. 
Congress regularly holds hearings on the threat of terrorism and the status of 
available intelligence on these threats. Reports and testimony often focus on the Islamic 
extremist threat and local intelligence resources.  
68 Bergen, and Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, 29. 
69 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010). 
70 Ibid., 19. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Public Broadcasting Service, “Are We Safer?,” Frontline, January 18, 2011. 
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Terrorism experts, such as Bruce Hoffman, Robert Bergen, and Stephen Flynn, 
presented testimony in September 2010 before the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Homeland Security Committee regarding The Evolving Nature of the Terrorism Threat: 
Nine Years after the 9/11 Attacks. During his testimony, Flynn stated, “[w]hen terrorists 
are homegrown, it is the streets of Bridgeport, Denver, Minneapolis, and other big and 
small communities across America that become the frontlines. That translates into local 
cops on the beat and increasingly the American public at large who must be better 
informed and empowered to deal with the terrorism threat.”73  
The March 2011 Congressional hearing on the radicalization of American 
Muslims, The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that 
Community’s Response, was the first in a series of controversial hearings on 
radicalization.74 These hearings certainly bring the issue of homegrown radicalization to 
the forefront, but produce negative publicity for the important topic of domestic terrorism 
by appearing to promote racial profiling and bias. The series of hearings focused on 
Islamic extremism only. Then-Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, 
Representative Peter King contended that the Committee and DHS were established to 
address the threat from al-Qaeda. He adamantly states, “[A]l-Qaeda is actively targeting 
the American Muslim Community for recruitment,” and, therefore, the hearings 
continued to focus on this international threat.75 
The September 2012 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on The 
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, focusing on Hate Crimes and the Threat of 
Domestic Extremism, provided testimony from FBI and DHS officials concerning the 
domestic terrorism threat and the importance of sharing information with state and local 
partners, particularly fusion centers. Their testimony also emphasized the importance of 
engaging the public in recognizing behaviors and indicators of terrorism. As always, 
73 Assessing the Terrorism Threat: The Implications for Homeland Security, testimony before the U.S. 
Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong., 3 (2010) (testiomny of Stephen Flynn). 
74 Hearing on the Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s 
Response, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. (2011), 
http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-%E2%80%9C-extent-radicalization-american-muslim-
community-and-communitys-response%E2%80%9D 
75 Ibid. (testimony of Peter King). 
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these agencies strive to maintain civil rights and civil liberties, while protecting the 
American public.76  
A major challenge for local law enforcement agencies, concerning the 
implementation of initiatives to investigate and prevent domestic terrorism, is the 
protection of privacy and civil liberties for U.S. citizens. A possible solution may be 
achieved with an engaged public that is aware of and involved in the process. An open 
and integrated process that includes the public and community-based prevention tactics 
should prove very successful, although difficult to define and implement given the 
potential costs and privacy concerns. The public plays a crucial role in the process, 
though, as evidenced by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions’ (IHSS) study 
finding that approximately 40 percent of 68 foiled potential terrorist attacks were stopped 
due to information provided by the public.77  
Some theorists argue that the domestic terrorist threat, from both Islamic and non-
Islamic extremist groups, may not be a significant issue, and that it is only the public’s 
fear of a perceived, albeit exaggerated, risk that underscores the issue. This may be due to 
how the problem is framed by the media, who often sensationalize the narrative. Also, 
politicians may promote fear in order to win elections and inspire confidence in their 
abilities by claiming that they will fix the problem once elected. In his book, The Science 
of Fear, Daniel Gardner wryly states that politicians talk about terrorism “as if it were the 
Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.”78 The risk is real, though, and terrorism experts, 
such as Flynn, Bergen, and Hoffman, agree that radicalization and recruitment in the U.S. 
are on the rise, and that attacks are becoming more difficult to prevent due to the 
diversification and evolution of the threat. 
As demonstrated in this literature review, the majority of studies, reports, and 
stories on domestic terrorism over the past few years have focused on homegrown 
76 “Durbin Chairs Hearing on Hate Crimes and the Threat of Domestic Extremism,” September 19, 
2012, Dick Durbin, http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=bc11acc3-dbf6-413d-
9e65-360e6fc68b0f  
77 Strom et al., Building on Clues. 
78 Gardner, The Science of Fear, 2. 
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jihadists, although the threat posed by non-Islamic terrorist groups may be sparking more 
interest lately given their increased violent behavior. Common recommendations put 
forth in the literature relate to the importance of local law enforcement in the intelligence 
collection process, continued vigilance and involvement by the public, the increasing 
violence of anti-government groups in the U.S., and the dangerousness of lone wolves; all 
of which can be addressed in a national counterterrorism doctrine.  
The next chapter will focus on how the domestic terrorist threat has evolved, from 
the 1980s and 1990s with the proliferation of militias and left- and right-wing extremist 
groups, through the current period of threats from foreign fighters and homegrown 
violent extremists, inspired by the likes of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iran and 
Syria (ISIS). The chapter also outlines the most prominent groups and tactics that are 
contributing to the increasing violence and presence of terrorist groups. On the contrary, 
there are other factors, such as the protection of civil liberties and media influence that 
contribute to the argument that domestic terrorism is overblown and does not require the 




III. SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE EMERGING THREAT OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Upon review of several studies and reports concerning domestic terrorism, there is 
clearly a long history of domestic terrorism in the United States. Over that time, the types 
of domestic terrorism crimes and the emerging terrorist groups have changed, and 
offenders are becoming more violent. At times, it is difficult to define and identify 
domestic terrorism and the various types of domestic terrorists because of similar 
motivations and actions with other general crimes and criminals, such as hate crimes and 
active shooters. 
A. DEFINING DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
In 2009, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse 
University, analyzed thousands of federal court and Department of Justice (DOJ) records 
concerning terrorism-related cases. Upon review, TRAC found that federal agencies 
differed in identifying who is a terrorist or what activities constitute terrorism activities, 
as evidenced by the lack of overlap among individuals targeted by federal agencies for 
investigation and prosecution under the federal terrorism laws. TRAC concluded that 
terrorism experts, legal groups, and DOJ officials are concerned that the “lack of a clear 
understanding of what constitutes terrorism has resulted in numerous civil liberties 
violations” and has potentially weakened law enforcement officials’ ability to use current 
criminal law as a tool to combat terrorism.79  
As difficult as it is to find an agreed upon definition of “terrorism,” an ultimate 
definition for “domestic” terrorism is also hard to come by. Per its website, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on the U.S. Code for formal definitions on terrorism, 
in its role to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. According to 18 U.S.C. § 2331,  
“[d]omestic terrorism” means activities with the following three 
characteristics: 
79 “Who Is a Terrorist? Government Failure to Define Terrorism Undermines Enforcement, Puts Civil 
Liberties at Risk,” Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, September 28, 2009, accessed October 6, 
2011, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/215/  
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• Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; 
• Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) 
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
or kidnapping; and 
• Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.80  
Also on its website, the FBI uses a simpler, narrower definition in a 2009 story 
regarding Domestic Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era: “Americans attacking Americans 
based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies.”81 The FBI identifies four categories of 
domestic terrorists: left-wing extremists, who promote revolutionary movements and the 
protection of people from capitalism and imperialism in the U.S.; right-wing extremists, 
who tout racial supremacy and anti-government beliefs; single issue groups, who target 
their attacks against individuals or institutions associated with political issues, such as 
abortion, testing on animals, and environmental protection; and homegrown Islamic 
extremists, or U.S. citizens who have become Islamic radicals.82  
The DOJ’s U.S. Attorneys Offices also use the U.S. Code definition for domestic 
terrorism to fulfill its role in not only the disruption and prevention of terrorist activities, 
but primarily the prosecution of accused terrorists. On its website, DOJ paraphrases the 
U.S. Code: 
Domestic terrorism includes acts within the territorial U.S. that are 
dangerous to human life, violate federal or state criminal laws, have no 
actual connection to international terrorists, and appear to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence domestic government 
policy through intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of our 
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.83 
80 “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” Federal Burau of Investigation, accessed August 31, 
2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition  
81 “Domestic Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 7, 2009, 
accessed August 31, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709 
82 Jonathan Masters, “Militant Extremists in the United States,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
February 7, 2011, accessed October 6, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-
networks/militant-extremists-united-states/p9236 
83 “Domestic Terrorism,” U.S. Department of Justice, accessed August 31, 3014, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing_room/ns/domestic_terrorism.html  
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Note the DOJ definition mentions that there is “no actual connection to 
international terrorists.”84 However, for many of the documented terrorist actions over 
the past decade, the perpetrator(s) had some influence by international terrorist groups. In 
the CRS Insights series, Jerome Bjelopera defines these offenders as “homegrown violent 
extremists,” who operate in the U.S. and are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations.85 
The concept of acquiring extremist ideologies and actions is often referred to as violent 
radicalization, which is defined as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, 
including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to effect 
societal change.”86 Another threat is from “foreign fighters,” defined as American 
citizens, legal permanent residents, or aliens who radicalized in the U.S. and plotted to or 
traveled abroad to join a foreign terrorist group.87 Additional categories of foreign 
fighters include U.S. citizens who return to America after having trained and/or engaged 
in combat overseas. Other Westerners, including Australians, are also included in this 
category. In addition, European citizens are also fighting overseas and pose a terrorist 
threat to the U.S., as they are not required to have a visa when entering the U.S. and may 
not be on U.S. or European watch lists. 
The term “domestic terror” is often interchanged with “hate crime,” raising 
questions about how these crimes are classified, and if domestic terrorism or hate crimes 
are over- or under-reported due to this blurring of definitions. According to a 2007 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) report, Hate Crime in America: The Debate Continues, 
hate crime laws vary from state to state, and “there is no standard legal definition of hate 
crime.”88 Hate crime statutes usually include designation of protected groups (e.g., race, 
gender, sexual orientation, etc.), a range of predicate or underlying crimes (e.g., assault) 
84 Ibid. 
85 Jerome Bjelopera, Domestic Terrorism Appears to Be Reemerging as a Priority at the Department 
of Justice, CRS Insights (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), accessed October 15, 
2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/IN10137.pdf, 2.  
86 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America.  
87 Bjelopera, “American Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State.” 
88 Michael Shively, and Carrie Mulford, “Hate Crime in America: The Debate Continues,” NIJ 
Journal [online], no. 257 (June 2007). accessed September 1, 2014, 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/257/Pages/hate-crime.aspx#states 
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and a requirement that hate or bias motivated the offense.89 Contrary to the definition of 
domestic terrorism, which identifies all civilians as potential victims, hate crime statutes 
often identify certain protected classes as being victimized by hate. Otherwise, the 
statutes and definitions are quite similar, which may influence how crimes are 
prosecuted, whether as hate crimes or domestic terrorism incidents. 
Another set of definitions that makes it unclear if the crime perpetrated is 
considered terrorism or general criminal behavior concerns the emerging threat of the 
“lone wolf” terrorist versus a disturbed or disgruntled individual who perpetrates a 
violent act. Most definitions of terrorism indicate that a group, with a political, social or 
religious objective, is responsible for the violence, and, therefore, a lone wolf terrorist’s 
actions are not always considered in the terrorism discussion. It was not until 1999 that 
the FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism described potential terrorist actors as being “a 
group or individual,” as opposed to a group or two or more individuals.90 According to 
Jeffrey Simon, an international consultant on terrorism, lone wolf terrorism should be 
defined the same as general terrorism, “but to qualify as a lone wolf, an individual would 
have to be working alone or have just minimal assistance from one or two other 
people.”91 
The lone wolf terrorist may also be identified as an “active shooter” as these 
incidents are usually perpetrated by a lone offender. U.S. government agencies define 
active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in 
a confined and populated area” by use of firearm(s).92 The FBI conducted a study of 
“active shooter” incidents in 2014, covering the period from 2000 through 2013. It 
looked at 160 cases; all but two of the incidents involved single shooters.93 
Adding to the issue of the vague definitions of domestic terrorism, hate crimes, 
and lone wolf terrorism, is the lack of an official listing of domestic terrorist and/or hate 
89 Ibid.  
90 Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism, 261. 
91 Ibid., 266. 
92 Blair, and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013. 
93 Ibid. 
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groups. Neither the FBI nor DOJ lists known domestic terrorist groups by name on their 
site, but they do list the common types of domestic terrorist groups, such as animal rights 
extremists, eco-terrorists, anarchists, anti-government extremists and unauthorized 
militias, and white supremacists. However, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) 
identified and posted the names of 1,096 anti-government “Patriot” groups that were 
active in 2013,94 as well as a “Hate Map” of the 939 active hate groups in the U.S.95  The 
SPLC does not claim, though, that these lists are exhaustive. 
B. EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Domestic terrorism incidents have been evoking fear and intimidation in 
Americans since the 1800s, when the far right Ku Klux Klan touted white and Christian 
supremacy through beatings, murder, and property destruction. Similar to today, domestic 
terrorist groups in the 1980s and 1990s included right- and left-wing extremist groups, 
and special interest groups, whose messages most often supported themes of anti-
government, white supremacy, anti-abortion, and animal rights. These messages were 
carried out via violent and criminal activities. Most troubling and rising were the right-
wing militias and patriot groups, or people with the belief that federal involvement had 
become too commonplace and citizens needed to take potentially violent actions to 
preserve their freedoms.96  
Adding to this legacy of terror are the actions perpetrated by the “lone wolf” or 
homegrown violent extremists, new terms that have entered the domestic terrorism 
discussion in recent years. Some of the most notorious domestic terrorist groups and 
events are outlined below.  
94 “Active Patriot Groups in the United States in 2013,” Intelligence Report, no. 153 (Spring 2014), 
Southern Poverty Law Center, accesed August 31, 2014, http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2014/spring/Active-Patriot-Groups-in-the-United-States  
95 “Hate Map,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed August 31, 2014, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map  
96 “Domestic Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era.” 
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1. Declining Terrorist Attacks/Increasing Casualties—1980s–1990s 
As is true today, there was no standard or agreed upon definition of terrorism in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was the lead federal 
agency for assessing a terrorist threat and investigating and responding to acts of 
terrorism. From the period 1982 to 1992, the FBI reported that a total of 165 terrorist 
incidents occurred domestically, primarily by domestic terrorist groups, such as Puerto 
Rican groups, left-wing extremists, and special interest groups.97 
Ecological terrorists and animal rights groups, such as the Earth Liberation Front 
(ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF), became more recognized in the 1990s and 
were named the number one domestic terrorist threat by the FBI in 2004. Since 1979, it 
has been responsible for perpetrating over two thousand crimes and causing more than 
$110 million in property damages and losses.98 ELF and ALF commonly engage in 
illegal activities that cause the greatest economic loss for a company, such as arson, fire 
bombings, vandalism, and stalking. 
In the 1990s, the number of domestic terrorism incidents were declining, but 
becoming more violent and deadly. Significant incidents of domestic terrorism in 
America, pre-9/11, were the 1993 bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City 
(six killed; nearly 1,000 injured); the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, the worst act of domestic terrorism in the United States at the 
time (168 killed, including 19 children; several hundred injured); and the Centennial 
Olympic Park bombing at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta (one killed; over 
100 injured). The World Trade Center bombing was tied to an international terrorist 
group, while the other two incidents were committed by right- and left-wing inspired 
individuals. Timothy McVeigh, the perpetrator of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, held 
extremist ideologies and had previous ties with a right-wing militia group. Eric Robert 
Rudolph, a serial bomber, convicted of the Olympic Park bombing as well as three 
97 Ibid., 5. 
98 Masters, “Militant Extremists in the United States.” 
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additional anti-gay and anti-abortion-themed bombings in the southern U.S., was tied to 
the Christian Identity/white supremacy movement.  
The militia movement began in the 1980s with the development of paramilitary 
groups, primarily consisting of white supremacists and survivalists, followed by the 
formation of the anti-government group known as Posse Comitatus. The combination of 
paramilitary activities and anti-government philosophy, as well as a string of 
controversial events in the early 1990s, initiated and reinforced the militia movement. At 
that time, militia leaders were incited by the election of Bill Clinton, the Rodney King 
riots, and passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Concerns about 
preserving their right to bear arms, though, were heightened after the deadly 
confrontations over illegal firearms at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992 and the Branch 
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, in 1993.99 These events promoted conspiracy 
theories among right-wing groups, who believed that the government intentionally 
murdered people and confiscated guns from citizens, in addition to other conspiracies.  
Although militias and other “Patriot” movement organizations began to die down 
in the 2000s, anger at the government and fear of conspiracies and confiscation of guns 
continue to be the drivers of the growing militia groups of today. Today, this anger is also 
directed at the more involved local law enforcement, whereas, in prior decades, it was the 
federal government that was primarily engaged in domestic terrorism prevention and 
investigations and, therefore, seen as the enemy of these radical groups. In addition, 
increased information-sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies makes 
the preservation of privacy and civil liberties an emerging fight, particularly among these 
groups.  
2. The Rise of International Terrorism—1990s 
The threat from international terrorism was nonexistent on U.S. soil, until foreign 
terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993. As a 
result, the FBI divided the international terrorist threat to the U.S. into three categories:  
99 “Extremism in America: The Militia Movement,” 2005, Anti-Defamation League, accessed October 
22, 2014, http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/militia_m.html?xpicked=4  
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a) Foreign (state) sponsors of international terrorism, including Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea; activities included funding, 
organizing, networking and providing other support to formal terrorist 
groups and loosely affiliated extremists. 
b) Formalized terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Al-
Gama’a, Al-Islamiyya, and Palestinian HAMAS; groups with their own 
infrastructures, personnel, finances, and training facilities able to plan and 
implement attacks overseas and within the U.S. 
c) Loosely affiliated international radical extremists (e.g., those who bombed 
the World Trade Center in 1993) did not represent a particular nation and 
were unknown to law enforcement, making them the most dangerous.100  
At the time, it was unimaginable that the international terrorist threat would move 
into the forefront of today’s discourse on domestic terrorism, and that, in 2002, there 
would be a need to establish a new federal cabinet agency devoted to the protection of the 
American people from terrorist threats: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
International terrorist groups of today are more visible, wealthy, and have greater access 
to disenchanted or vulnerable individuals via social media and Internet sites. They have 
proven successful at influencing, recruiting, and training individuals from the West and 
using these individuals to plot and execute lone wolf attacks against the U.S. and its 
Western allies. 
3. Other Domestic Terrorism Incidents and Responses in the 1990s 
In the decade prior to September 11, 2001, there was concern that in the event of a 
catastrophic incident, intense coordination among federal, state, and local emergency 
responders would be required, but that the existing capability was inadequate, especially 
among state and local responders. Failures in coordination and interoperability were 
demonstrated in the weak response to the Columbine High School shooting in Littleton, 
Colorado in 1999. Although this and other pre-9/11 domestic terrorist acts were shocking, 
they were also rare and could not justify the expense for providing additional training and 
tools for first responders to address terrorism. Based on the response to these events, 
100 “Domestic Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era.” 
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however, it was clear that state and local responders needed to be able to respond 
immediately and fully and be informed.101 
Pre-9/11, there was no standard or agreed upon definition of terrorism. The FBI 
was the lead federal agency charged with assessing terrorist threats, investigating and 
responding to acts of terrorism and, like the FBI of today, used the U.S. Code to define 
terrorism. In addition, the threat of domestic terrorism was not as significant then as it is 
today with the rise in violence among right-wing “patriot” groups, left-wing eco-terrorists 
and animal rights extremists, and the threat of homegrown violent extremism. Incessant 
media coverage and political rhetoric concerning the terrorist threat to the homeland have 
made the severity of the subject, exaggerated or not, abundantly clear to the general 
public. Today, the general public is urged to be vigilant and assist in reporting suspicious 
activities.  
C. CURRENT SCOPE OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
As described above in the definitions for the various types of domestic terrorism 
and offenders, domestic terrorism attacks have been committed against Americans by the 
traditional types of domestic terrorists: the non-Islamic extremist Americans with no 
connection to international terrorist groups. Since 9/11, however, the United States has 
seen an increase in radicalization of violent extremists who have been influenced by 
international terrorist groups or are foreign fighters who have been trained and 
radicalized in foreign countries, only to return to the U.S. to potentially carry out terrorist 
activities. This is not to say that the traditional domestic terrorist groups, such as right- 
and left-wing extremist groups, are no longer a serious threat. On the contrary, several 
studies and reports continue to profile these groups, their growing numbers, and their 
increasing violence. Both types of domestic terrorism threats appear to be growing, but 
how serious are these threats? Are they serious enough to make changes in domestic 
intelligence policies, procedures, and organization, as well as the federal, state, and local 
law enforcement’s focus on domestic terrorism? The seriousness of the situation will be 
examined in this chapter and analyzed in later chapters. 
101 Domestic Terrorism: An Overview (Washington, DC: National Criminal Justice Association). 
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1. Non-Islamic Terrorist Groups 
Recent studies, investigative reports, and intelligence products show that non-
Islamic domestic terrorist groups may pose a greater threat than the Islamic extremist 
groups. According to the New America Foundation website, updated October 2014, there 
were 433 homegrown extremists charged from 2001 through 2014, of which 181 were 
non-jihadist extremists and 38 of 64 victims were killed by non-jihadist extremists.102 
An October 2010 Institute for Homeland Security Solutions report looked at 
domestic terrorist plots, over the past decade, by groups with all types of ideological 
philosophies. The report urges homeland security officials to  
continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do 
not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by “lone 
wolves.” Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, 
and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or 
anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways.103  
Another example of the seriousness of the threat from non-Islamic extremist 
groups is found in a series of national assessments on terrorism developed by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). A 
January 2009 I&A report states that left-wing extremism activities, particularly 
cybercrime, will increase over the next decade.104 An April 2009 report on domestic 
right-wing extremism warns of increasing recruitment and radicalization.105 This report 
further states that right-wing lone wolves and small terrorist cells “are the most 
dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States.”106 In July 2014, I&A released 
an Intelligence Assessment concluding that Domestic Violent Extremists Pose Increased 
Threat to Government Officials and Law Enforcement, based on recent “violence 
committed by militia extremists and lone offenders who hold violent anti-government 
102 New America’s International Security Program, “Homegrown Extremism 2001–2014.” 
103 Strom et al., Building on Clues, 1. 
104 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Leftwing Extremists Likely.   
105 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Rightwing Extremism. 
106 Ibid. 
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beliefs.”107 This is also known as the Patriot Movement, a popular faction of right-wing 
extremists in the 1990s that is seeing a resurgence today. 
a. Militias  
A 2010 Time magazine cover story gave a detailed account of “The Secret World 
of Extreme Militias” and highlighted the rise in armed and violent anti-government 
extremist groups. This article, too, warns of the danger of lone wolves, an issue that a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterterrorism expert states is its “biggest 
concern.”108 
Militia groups, for the most part, believe they are legitimate, necessary, and 
established in accordance with the Constitution. Their claim is that they are “(a) 
equivalent to the statutory militia; (b) not, however, controlled by the government; and 
(c) in fact, designed to oppose the government should it become tyrannical.”109 
Militias reached their peak in the mid-1990s, although this country has seen a 
growing number of militia groups and militia training camps over the past few years. It 
appears this uptick is a reaction to the faltering economy and the liberal presidential 
administration, which have inspired new conspiracy theories and rumors primarily on the 
Internet. Politicians and political news commentators have contributed to the 
militia/patriot movement frenzy with their own unlikely opinions and theories. For 
example, Texas governor Rick Perry has touted the 1990s militia idea of secession, and 
Fox News’ Glenn Beck has brought up 1990s anxieties about the existence of U.S. 
government-run concentration camps.110 As a result of these theories, as well as anti-
government videos and messages commonly found on the Internet, Patriots are 
107 The National Assessment cites the April 2014 armed standoff in Bunkerville, Nevada (NV) 
between militia extremists and the NV Bureau of Land Management (BLM) concerning BLM officers’ 
attempt to enforce a court order to impound a rancher’s cattle located on federal land, as the rancher refused 
to pay grazing fees; and the June 2014 ambush/murder of two Las Vegas police officers by two violent 
anti-government extremists who were also present at the Bunkerville standoff. DHS Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, Domestic Violent Extremists. 
108 Gellman, “The Secret World of Extreme Militias.” 
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110 Larry Keller, The Second Wave (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2009). 
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stockpiling weapons and food, in preparation for impending “social chaos.” The Southern 
Poverty Law Center has documented 75 right-wing extremist domestic terrorist plots 
since the Oklahoma City bombing, through 2009, and noted that anti-government 
ideology, such as from militias/Sovereign Citizen groups, was the basis for the actual and 
planned attacks.111 
b. Sovereign Citizens  
According to the FBI, “Sovereign Citizen” groups are developing throughout the 
country, and they strongly believe that federal, state, and local governments have too 
much authority, for which they do not have to answer.112 As a result, Sovereign Citizens 
often refuse to pay taxes or carry an official license or car registration, and they use 
counterfeit money at government agencies. Their actions are not always illegal, but they 
have been known to commit violent and deadly acts, especially against government 
officials.  
The FBI reported that, from 2000 to 2011, Sovereign Citizen lone offenders were 
responsible for the deaths of six law enforcement officers.113 The DHS I&A has tracked 
Sovereign Citizen activities since 2010, and it reports that their violent acts have 
averaged just over five offenses per year.114 The SPLC also tracks the Sovereign Citizen 
movement as part of their profiles of extremist groups.  
According to the SPLC website,  
The strange subculture of the sovereign citizens movement, whose 
adherents hold truly bizarre, complex antigovernment beliefs, has been 
growing at a fast pace since the late 2000s. Sovereigns believe that they—
not judges, juries, law enforcement or elected officials—get to decide 
which laws to obey and which to ignore, and they don’t think they should 
have to pay taxes. Sovereigns are clogging up the courts with 
indecipherable filings and when cornered, many of them lash out in rage, 
111 Ibid. 
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frustration and, in the most extreme cases, acts of deadly violence, usually 
directed against government officials.115 
The group does not have a centralized organization or leader; instead, there are 
many individual groups throughout the country with leaders who have their own 
Sovereign Citizen ideology. SPLC is unable to provide a total membership number 
because there is no central or organized group, but it estimates that there are upwards of 
300,000 hard-core members and supporters. The SPLC estimates their membership 
numbers will grow given the current economic crisis.116  The Anti-Defamation League 
reported in 2010 that although the movement is dominated by white members, they were 
seeing an increase in the development of African-American sovereign groups, calling it 
the “Moorish” movement.117 Most commonly, the Sovereign Citizens resort to “paper 
terrorism” in which they inundate the court system with long, drawn out court filings or 
complaints, and file false documents to discredit government officials. However, they are 
capable of and have demonstrated acts of lethal violence.  
A notable violent Sovereign Citizen event took place in 2010 when two Arkansas 
police officers were killed by Sovereign Citizen Jerry Kane during a traffic stop. Kane 
shot one officer 11 times and the other officer 14 times. Kane was with his 16-year old 
son, Joseph, and they were both killed in a shootout later than day, after injuring a sheriff 
and chief deputy.118  
The most recent anti-government extremist/lone offender incident was committed 
in Pennsylvania, on September 12, 2014, by survivalist and marksman Eric Frein, who 
ambushed two state troopers, killing one. A nearly seven-week manhunt ensued and, 
once apprehended, Frein faced several charges, including two counts of terrorism for 
allegedly shooting the state troopers to influence the policy of government and affecting 
115 “Sovereign Citizens Movement,” Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011, accessed December 13, 
2011, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement 
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the conduct of government.119 The incidents mentioned above are indicators of the 
growing violence of anti-government extremist groups and the increasing threat to law 
enforcement. 
2. Violent Domestic Islamic Extremists 
Although domestic terrorists have been traditionally American extremists with 
anti-government ideoligies who threaten and harm Americans, it is the threat from 
foreign fighters that has now entered into the domestic terrorism discussion. This 
includes the growing threat from terrorist groups that are overseas, yet are training and 
recruiting Americans to fight for their cause either overseas against fellow Americans or 
by returning home and continuing their terrorist activities.  
The July 2014 testimony by Seth Jones before the House Homeland Security 
Committee, Subcommitee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence highlighted this growing 
trend. According to Jones, there are more violent extremist Westerners in Syria than in 
past jihadi battles, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 2011, Jones estimates that 100–
200 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to join dissident 
organizations, and that many of these individuals may return to the U.S. and engage in 
terrorist activities. It is difficult to identify these individuals, who usually are unknown to 
intelligence organizations and are, therefore, able to return to the U.S. undetected because 
they are not on European or American terrorism watch lists. An alarming statistic cited 
by Jones is that the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda, and the number 
of fighters comprising these groups, have steadily grown since 1988 with three groups in 
1988 to 51 groups in 2013; the most significant increase taking place in the period since 
2010, with 32 groups in 2010 and 51 groups in 2013. These increases were due to the 
Salafi-jihadist groups in North Africa and Levant (area including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Israel, Palestine, and southern Turkey), which grew by 55 percent. Safe havens for the 
groups’ fighters are primarily in Libya in North Africa and in Syria in the Levant. There 
was a 167 percent increase in the number of terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
119 Ray Sanchez, and David Shortell, “Suspected Pennsylvania Cop Killer Charged with Terrorism,” 
CNN, November 14, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/13/justice/pennsylvania-eric-frein-charges/ 
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from 2010 to 2013, with the highest number (44 percent) perpetrated by the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 and by al Shabaab (46 percent) in 2012.120  
As mentioned above, the U.S. has not been very successful in identifying those 
individuals who are being trained in Syria, as they are unknown and often do not appear 
on watch lists. Therefore, they go undetected and unmonitored, as is the case of most lone 
wolf offenders. The 2014 CRS Insights briefing on American foreign fighters identifies 
these individuals by three categories: the Departed—an estimated 100 Americans who 
have traveled to Syria to fight with extremist factions; the Returned—American foreign 
fighters who have trained with extremist groups and returned to the U.S. to potentially 
carry out terrorist activities; and the Inspired—Americans who are inspired to carry out 
terrorist acts based on ISIS progoganda from social media sites and the Internet. 
Furthermore, the report cites that “over a half dozen” individuals have been arrested by 
the FBI for attempting to leave the U.S. to fight for the Islamic State in Syria.121 
Throughout 2014, ISIS has emerged as a wealthy, powerful, and influential 
terrorist group that has taken to social media to recruit followers with the message to 
carry out lone wolf attacks on Western targets. It has proven itself to be ruthless and 
successful at spreading fear and intimidation with regular appearances on the Internet via 
video showing beheadings of hostages from the U.S. and its allies, as well as reports of 
ongoing massacres of Muslims and Sunni Tribesmen in Iraq. These terrifying images and 
accounts may be the cause of the recent spike in fear of a rise in Islamic extremism in the 
U.S., according to a Pew Research Center poll conducted in September 2014, when 53 
percent of adults nationwide admitted they were “very concerned,” as opposed to only 36 
percent being “very concerned” in July 2011.122  
Since 2010, homegrown violent extremists have been primarily striking based on 
influences from Islamic extremist groups, but not out of direct association with an 
organized group. According to published reports, the Tsarnaev brothers, alleged 
120 Jihadist Sanctuaries in Syria and Iraq (testimony of Seth G. Jones). 
121 Bjelopera, “American Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State.” 
122 “Terrorism,” accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm 
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perpetrators of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, successfully detonated bombs made 
from pressure cookers by following bomb-making instructions from the English-language 
al’Qaeda magazine, Inspire.123 It is believed that one brother, Tamerlan, was known to 
intelligence officials, but was not watched closely because he had not been connected 
with any criminal activity.124 In this case, local law enforcement were unaware of risk 
assessments done on Tamerlan by the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). It is 
unknown if this information would have somehow prevented the Boston Marathon 
bombings, but it is a lesson learned about the continuing issues with information sharing 
among federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcment agencies.  
ISIS and other foreign extremists groups are adept at influencing susceptible 
individuals in the U.S. into joining their cause and/or perpetrating terrorist attacks as a 
show of support. The individuals and plots are found in the local communities and are 
difficult to identify. However, local law enforcement and the general public within those 
communities would be most likely to observe and report suspicious behavior that lead to 
foiled attacks. Local law enforcement from the communities where domestic terrorism 
plots are planned and implemented must receive threat intelligence in order to make 
informed decisions during routine criminal investigations and community policing. This 
“bottom up” approach should be embraced by the FBI, the lead domestic intelligence 
agency, which is once again falling short of sharing all information with local law 
enforcement and failing to “connect the dots.” Using state and local law enforcement to 
be on the front lines, as the eyes and ears of the domestic intelligence community, should 
be a key tenet of the U.S.’s counterterrorism doctrine. 
3. Active Shooters and Lone Wolf Offenders 
As mentioned several times, the most succesful and feared domestic terrorist is 
the lone wolf offender. One of the most common methods of attack by the lone wolf 
offender is with the use of firearms. As a result, lone wolf offenders are often referred to 
as active shooters. The 2014 FBI study on “active shooters” demonstrates that this type of 
123 Bergen et al., Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, 17. 
124 Ibid. 
42 
                                                 
event, although not always terrorism-related, is increasing and can occur anywhere in the 
country. Of the 160 incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2013, “an average of 6.4 
incidents occurred in the first 7 years studied, and an average of 16.4 occurred in the last 
7 years.”125 It is interesting to note that these shootings occurred in 40 of the 50 U.S. 
states as well as the District of Columbia. The study did not address the shooters’ 
motivations or ideology, so the relation to terrorism is not clear. However, some of the 
shooters’ characteristics are important to note. School shootings were primarily 
committed by students at the schools (17 of 20 shooters at middle and high schools); 
shootings that occurred in places of business were primarily carried out by current or 
former employees (22 of 23 shooters). Another significant factor in the shootings were 
the relationships of the shooters to one or more of the victims; in 30 of the 160 incidents, 
the shooter was targeting family members and/or a current, estranged, or former spouse 
or girlfriend. The active shooter incidents that took place in government properties (16 of 
160 or 10 percent), may be attributed to terrorism, as one such incident was the Fort 
Hood, Texas (TX) shooting,126 which had the third highest number of casualties of the 
160 incidents studied (45 casualties: 13 killed, 32 wounded). Another possible terrorism 
connection could be made in shooting incidents at places of worship, which comprises 
six, or 3.8 percent, of the incidents reviewed.127 
The IHSS conducted a 10-year study, titled Building on Clues: Examining 
Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009, in which it 
reviewed 86 foiled and executed terrorist attacks on the U.S. from 1999 to 2009. This 
study warns that lone wolves planned or perpetrated more than 40 percent of terrorist acts 
during the 10-year period studied. Of all groups (unorganized small, organized small, 
large, individual) studied, lone wolves were the most successful in executing attacks with 
a nearly 30 percent execution rate in comparison to a 16 percent average execution for 
125 Blair, and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 
2013. 
126 On November 5, 2009, at 1:20 p.m., Nidal Malik Hasan, 39, armed with two handguns, began 
shooting inside the Fort Hood Soldier Readiness Processing Center in Fort Hood, TX. 
127 Blair, and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 
2013. 
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small and large groups. This study also touted the importance of the role in the 
counterterrorism process for the more than 17,000 state and local law enforcement 
officials. They and the general public were responsible for providing observations and 
tips that contributed to foiling 80 percent of the terrorist plots that were not executed.128 
Another important commonality is that active shooters and lone wolf offenders 
most often have a history of mental health issues, many of which have gone untreated. 
This was clearly the issue for the lone shooters in three of the four highest casualty 
incidents: Prior to killing 12 and wounding 58 in the July 2012 shooting at the Cinemark 
Century 16 Theater in Aurora, Colorado (CO), James Eagan Holmes has claimed he 
suffers from mental illness;129 Seung Hui Cho, diagnosed with a severe anxiety disorder, 
killed 32 and wounded 17 in the 2007 Virginia Polytechnic Institute shooting in 
Blacksburg, Virginia (VA);130 and Adam Lanza, who killed 27 and wounded two in the 
2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre in Newtown, Connecticut (CT), was 
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder, and 
Asperger syndrome—all for which he refused medication.131 As with concerns about 
civil liberties, medical issues also require privacy protections and make it difficult to 
identify someone with violent tendencies. Privacy concerning mental illnesses must also 
be considered when collecting intelligence and developing counterterrorism policies. 
D. DRIVING FORCES 
In the consideration of the active domestic terrorist groups and incidents 
discussed above, it is important to know the overarching concerns of the federal, state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement officials responsible for addressing domestic terrorism. 
First, is the domestic terrorist threat truly becoming more widespread and/or violent? 
128 Strom et al., Building on Clues. 
129 Jack Healy, “Mental Evaluations Endorse Insanity Plea in Colorado Shootings, Defense Says,” 
New York Times, May 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/james-holmes-aurora-shooting-
suspect-enters-insanity-plea.html?_r=0 
130 Emily Friedman, Va. Tech Shooter Seung-Hui Cho’s Mental Health Records Released, August 19, 
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/seung-hui-chos-mental-health-records-released/story?id=8278195 
131 Hannah Schwarz and Marek Ramilo, Sandy Hook Shooter Treated at Yale, January 22, 2014, 
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/01/22/sand-hook-shooter-treated-at-yale/ 
44 
                                                 
Also, which offenders have become the most dangerous or difficult to detect and prevent? 
The following indicators (driving forces), compiled from studies, reports, and subject 
matter experts’ testimony over the past few years, demonstrate support of the claim that 
domestic terrorism in the United States is growing and should be a more prominent issue 
requiring attention from Congress; federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and 
government agencies; and the general public.  
1. The Increasing Violence Perpetrated by Domestic Extremist Groups 
There are national strategies, congressional testimony, and studies that highlight 
the past and current threats from radicalized Islamic extremists, but what about the non-
Islamic extremist groups in the U.S.? How are these groups evolving and why is there 
little emphasis on the potential threats posed by these groups? In fact, a major indication 
of the growing domestic terrorist threat is the overwhelming assertion that anti-
government extremist groups are the “single greatest concern” faced by law enforcement. 
This is the public opinion of Minnesota Sheriff Rich Stanek, chair of the National 
Sheriffs’ Association Homeland Security Committee, following a lengthy discussion on 
homeland security issues at the 2014 National Sheriffs’ Association conference.132 His 
claim is shared by other experts and law enforcement personnel alike and is supported by 
several studies and reports. Although a Southern Poverty Law Center report shows that 
the number of active hate groups in the U.S. declined in 2013, there has been an overall 
increase of hate groups by 56 percent since 2000.133 The SPLC’s spring 2014 edition of 
Intelligence Report warns that even though there has been a decline, there is still concern 
that the radical right in America is highly dangerous. According to SPLC Senior Fellow 
Mark Potok, “The weakening of groups often has the effect of fostering, rather than 
132 Jason Sickles, “Online Rants, Anti-Government Radicals Fuel Fear of U.S. Cop Killings,” July 14, 
2014, Yahoo News, accessed August 28, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/online-rants-rightwing-extremism-
fuel-fears-for-us-cops- 
133 “Hate and Extremism,” Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014, accessed September 1, 2014, 
http://www.splcenter.org/what-we-do/hate-and-extremism  
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retarding, followers’ decisions to finally act out violently.”134 According to the report, 
more than 2,000 hate and patriot groups exist.135 
2. Social Media Impact 
Terrorist groups around the world are reaching huge audiences by using social 
media sites, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Flickr, to spread 
propaganda, raise funds, and recruit individuals for training and perpetrating lone wolf 
attacks. According to terrorism specialist Jerome Bjelopera, the Internet effectively 
contributes to radicalization in three ways:  
First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages with suggestive audio 
and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and 
interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet 
“normal[izes] behaviors considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-
world environments.”136 
3. Recent Threat Assessments Warn against Violent Domestic Extremist 
Groups 
The FBI’s internal report, 2013 National Threat Assessment for Domestic 
Extremism, profiled eight domestic extremist groups in the U.S. that currently and will 
continue to present a “moderate” threat and concluded that lone offenders and small cells 
continue to present the greatest threat in 2014.137 Oddly, this report does not discuss the 
threat to the homeland from Islamist terrorist threats. The Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) also focused on the non-Islamic 
extremist groups in its 2014 Intelligence Assessment, Domestic Violent Extremists Pose 
Increased Threat to Government Officials and Law Enforcement.138 Per DHS, the 
primary threat is from militia extremists and lone offenders with anti-government 
ideologies. Publication of these reports indicate a renewed interest by the federal 
134 Potok, The Year in Hate and Extremism. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, 22. 
137 Bill Gertz, “FBI National Domestic Threat Assessment Omits Islamist Terrorism,” August 29, 
2014, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/fbi-national-domestic-threat-assessment-omits-islamist-
terrorism/ 
138 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Domestic Violent Extremists. 
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government in the domestic terrorist threat, as very few intelligence assessments have 
been published over the past few years: DHS I&A published Leftwing Extremists Likely 
to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade and Rightwing Extremism: 
Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and 
Recruitment in 2009, and the FBI published a limited distribution National Terrorism 
Assessment on Domestic Terrorism in 2012.  
4. Proliferation of Lone Wolves 
As mentioned above, lone wolves and small cell extremist groups pose the 
greatest domestic terrorist threat, according to a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) report.139 Lone wolves have proven to be the most successful in executing terrorist 
plots and active shootings incidents. The high-profile foreign terrorist group, Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has encouraged supporters from Western countries to carry 
out lone wolf attacks against the U.S. and its allies. This campaign has been successful 
with recent lone wolf attacks against government, law enforcement, and military officers 
in Canada and the U.S., with evidence that the offenders were influenced by the ISIS 
propaganda. 
E. RESTRAINING FORCES 
In contrast to the driving forces that support the seriousness of the current 
domestic terrorism threat, the following restraining forces denote that there is not enough 
evidence to indicate the current domestic terrorism threat is a growing issue. 
1. Decline in the Number of Domestic Extremist Groups 
As mentioned in the section above, the Southern Poverty Law Center reports that 
the number of hate groups in the United States declined in 2013. This reduction, claims 
the SPLC, is due to enhanced crackdown on radical right extremist groups by law 
enforcement, and the collapse or near-collapse of many groups due to various 
organizational or legal issues. “The number of hate groups last year dropped for the 
139 Gertz, “FBI National Domestic Threat Assessment Omits Islamist Terrorism.” 
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second year in a row, down 7% from 1,007 in 2012 to 939, after reaching a 2011 high of 
1,018,” according to the latest count by the SPLC.140 
2. Media Influence on the Severity of Domestic Terrorism 
The media have been instrumental in bringing news of terrorism threats and 
incidents to the attention of the American public. According to polling figures, 
Americans’ concerns about terrorism increase around the time that there is a terrorist 
incident or the anniversary of a major terrorist incident, such as 9/11. Following the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, media stories of right-wing extremist bomber Timothy 
McVeigh indicated that he once belonged to a militia group. Militias were then 
highlighted in the media with the implication that they were a threat, but there was no 
basis for this other than McVeigh’s alleged association with a militia.141 Since 9/11, 
many non-Islamic extremist plots have been foiled, but have not received the attention as 
that of domestic Islamic extremist plots in the U.S.142 The media only focus on the 
narrative at the time of the incident even though that may not be the greatest threat. 
3. Civil Liberties and Privacy Protections 
Concerns about violation of civil liberties and privacy protections are at the 
forefront of the counterterrorism discussion. Although the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), state fusion centers, and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative state up front that they are careful about protecting civil liberties, 
there is an ongoing debate with advocacy groups who oppose the need for the incessant 
and intrusive collection and sharing of information, or data mining, to counter the 
140 Potok, The Year in Hate and Extremism. 
141 Gardner, The Science of Fear, 171. 
142 According to Gardner, there are many examples: on October 1, 2005, Joel Henry Hinrichs, III, a 
non-Muslim suicide bomber detonated himself outside a packed stadium at University of Oklahoma; 
treated as a minor local story and ignored. On April 2007 Alabama Free Militia, six white men, arrested in 
Collinsville, Alabama with a machine gun, a rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, two silencers, 2,500 rounds of 
ammunition, and various homemade explosives, including 130 hand grenades and 70 improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs). The group was planning to attack Hispanics living in a nearby town. Media ignored this 
story, but one week later, six Muslims were arrested for conspiring to attack Fort Dix, and this made 
international news even though they were not as armed as the Alabama Free Militia. Gardner, The Science 
of Fear, 171–173. 
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terrorist threat. In The Science of Fear, author Daniel Gardner wonders if the 
demonstration by the government in collecting huge amounts of intelligence, almost too 
great to process, is only to placate the fear instilled in the American public by the 9/11 
attacks. Gardner appropriately states, “[y]ears of feverish intelligence work has 
uncovered astonishingly little.”143 Since mental illness is a condition often found in lone 
wolves and active shooters, this is also a piece of information that may be used as a 
predictor of potential violent attacks or violent offenders. However, medical conditions 
are private and the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
protects the confidentiality and security of healthcare information. 
As outlined in this chapter, the domestic terrorist threat has changed over the 
years and is a dynamic and complex threat. It is not only domestic left- and right-wing 
extremist groups that are active today, but the threats and successful radicalization efforts 
by international terrorist groups that have contributed to the overall domestic terrorist 
threat. Radical extremists, especially lone wolf actors, are becoming more difficult to 
detect and their reach is widespread with the increased use of social media and the 
Internet.  
The next chapter will focus on the structure and efforts of the domestic 
intelligence agencies, at all levels of government. These agencies have seen reforms and 
instituted improvements since 9/11, but there are still gaps in information-sharing and 
community engagement that must be addressed. 
143 Ibid., 251. 
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IV. SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF 
THE FBI, STATE FUSION CENTERS, AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT REGARDING DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
A. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM FOCUS 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, there were two respected and 
comprehensive reports that concluded that the Intelligence Community’s (IC) lack of 
coordination and communication greatly contributed to the failure to detect and prevent 
the attacks.144 The first, The Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before 
and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, stated that the “breakdown in 
communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in agencies’ 
missions, legal authorities and cultures.”145 The 9/11 Commission also found that the IC 
lacked information-sharing and coordination, and the overall areas in which the IC 
needed improvement included (1) imagination (2) policy (3) capabilities, and (4) 
management.146 
In response to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, the IC was reorganized 
with the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 
2004, which established the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the senior 
intelligence official responsible for advising the president, the National Security Council, 
and Homeland Security Council.147 “National intelligence” focuses on foreign threats, 
domestic threats, and homeland security.148 The DNI took over the National Intelligence 
144 Todd M. Masse, The National Counterterrorism Center: Implementation Challenges and Issues 
for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), CRS-3. 
145 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2002), p S. Rept. 107–351, H. Rept. 107–792, 
p.xvii. 
146 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission], The Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 
2004), 355–356. 
147 President Barack Obama merged the Homeland Security Council into the National Security 
Council. 
148 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 29. 
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Council, responsible for preparing national intelligence estimates and the President’s 
daily brief staff. The DNI does not have authority, however, over two key domestic 
intelligence agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). The domestic intelligence system includes the FBI, the DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the intelligence units/programs within the Coast 
Guard, U.S. Treasury, and various cities and states. There is no one domestic intelligence 
lead agency, which raises concerns about the abilities of this multi-agency system to 
effectively communicate and share timely information.149   
The FBI is this country’s domestic intelligence agency and is responsible for 
protecting and defending the United States against terrorist threats. Since 9/11, the FBI 
has made major reforms in its intelligence capacity by focusing on “a threat-based, 
intelligence-led approach.” Its main focus is to collect intelligence and develop a 
complete threat picture that allows it to strategically address the threats and encourage 
closer collaboration and information-sharing with other federal, state, local, tribal, and 
foreign law enforcement partners. The integration of intelligence and law enforcement 
capabilities helps to identify intelligence gaps and ensure that resources are targeting the 
highest priorities and greatest threats. In 2005, the FBI created the National Security 
Branch (NSB) to focus on counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and 
weapons of mass destruction. It has also recruited high-performing intelligence analysts 
and offered professional development opportunities to analysts through improved training 
and leadership development programs. Recent FBI improvements include the reinstituted 
Intelligence Branch and establishment of a Countering Violent Extremism Office. 
The FBI’s joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs) are on the front line in terrorism 
investigations by offering the skills and expertise of “investigators, analysts, linguists, 
SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.”150 According to the FBI’s website, the JTTFs “do it all: chase 
149 Arthur S. Hulnick, “Home Time: A New Paradigm for Domestic Intelligence,” International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no 4 (2009): 569–585. 
150 “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, accessed September 28, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs 
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down leads, gather evidence, make arrests, provide security for special events, conduct 
training, collect and share intelligence, and respond to threats and incidents at a 
moment’s notice.”151 There are now over 100 JTTFs that include FBI agents and task 
force officers from 32 federal and 671 state, local, and tribal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.152 Their mission is to investigate terrorism matters and coordinate 
counterterrorism efforts, and they have successfully foiled attacks and broken up known 
terrorist cells. However, local law enforcement representation on the JTTFs is usually 
from major city or urban area police departments who can spare the personnel for this 
mission, leaving the majority (80 percent) of local law enforcement agencies without 
visibility of or input on terrorism investigations. An additional concern is that even if a 
police department is represented on the JTTF, it may be prohibited from receiving all 
types of information. For example, the Boston Police Department (BPD) is a major urban 
area police department with representation on the Boston JTTF. However, threat 
information obtained from the 2011 Boston JTTF assessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who 
was accused of the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, was not shared with the BPD. 
Per the memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the FBI and federal, state, and 
local entities assigned to the JTTF, agency representatives may not share information 
with their parent agencies without permission from the FBI.153  
Each of the 56 FBI field offices has established field intelligence groups (FIGs), a 
combination of intelligence and investigative capabilities. The FIGs are used to collect 
and analyze raw data to identify intelligence gaps. Through these the FBI disseminates 
the information to its partners in the intelligence community and law enforcement in the 
form of intelligence information reports (IIRs).154 The purpose of the FIGs and IIRs is to 
enhance the FBI’s counterterrorism mission by spreading resources from their central 
headquarters location to the FBI field offices, in the communities where the threats and 
intelligence collection are occurring. Again, not all local law enforcement agencies, 
151 Ibid.  
152 There were 35 JTTFs in existence in 2001. 
153 Majority Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, The Road to Boston. 
154 Bjelopera, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations.  
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especially those in smaller communities, are engaged with the FIGs. This raises the 
concern that not all pertinent intelligence is being collected and shared, and, therefore, the 
big picture of the domestic terrorism threat is not realized.   
DHS supports state-level intelligence agencies known as fusion centers, initially 
established to share terrorist-related information among state, local, tribal, and federal 
law enforcement. Their mission is to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and 
dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism 
intelligence and information. The National Network of Fusion Centers comprises state 
and major urban area centers, which provide the federal government with the state and 
local perspective on national threats. In 2008, the federal government established 
Baseline Capabilities for Major State and Local Fusion Centers to emphasize the standard 
by which all fusion centers should operate. Fusion center directors, in 2010, synthesized 
this information to institute what they believed were  
The four Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs): 
• Receive: Ability to receive classified and unclassified information from 
federal partners 
• Analyze: Ability to assess local implications of that threat information 
through the use of a formal risk assessment process 
• Disseminate: Ability to further disseminate that threat information to other 
state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector entities within their 
jurisdiction 
• Gather: Ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate it, 
analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate.155 
Fusion center personnel include federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement 
agencies. Some fusion centers include representatives from the military, such as the 
National Guard, fire service, critical infrastructure operators, other private sector security 
personnel, emergency management, and public health personnel.156  
155 Department of Homeland Security, National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet, August 6, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet 
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A current resource in the domestic intelligence enterprise, and critical to fusion 
centers, is the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which 
takes locally generated intelligence and is shared with federal, state, and other local 
jurisdictions. These reports contain local law enforcement’s observations of suspicious 
behavior, 911 calls, and other tips from the general public.  
The concept of operations for the NSI is provided in Figure 1. The cycle of 
information sharing is depicted in a five-step process: planning, gathering and processing, 
analysis and production, dissemination, and reevaluation. Basically, the suspicious 
activity is observed and then reported in the SAR. The report is vetted by local law 
enforcement and shared with the state/local fusion center for further vetting by a trained 
intelligence analyst. The approved SAR is entered into the information sharing 
environment for access by authorized intelligence agencies and users. The process allows 
local law enforcement and fusion centers to share information with key partners 




Figure 1.  Nationwide SAR cycle157 
Although intelligence gathering has improved since the IRTPA of 2004 
prioritized the integration of intelligence, recent domestic terrorism plots and foiled 
attacks revealed that there are still gaps, especially with regard to coordination of 
information among the intelligence agencies. Currently, the IC can integrate foreign and 
domestic intelligence to reveal a comprehensive common operating picture. However, 
domestic intelligence agencies are challenged in achieving a proper balance between the 
two because there are different rules for what information can and cannot be collected, 
especially in the case of collecting domestic intelligence on U.S. citizens whose privacy 
and civil liberties must be protected.  
According to a September 2010 report from the Bipartisan Policy Center’s 
National Security Preparedness Group, the U.S. is “stumbling blindly through the legal, 
157 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Final Report: Information Sharing Environment (ISE)-Suspicious 
Activity Reporting (SAR) Evaluation Environment (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2010), 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/NSI_EE.pdf, 14.   
56 
                                                 
operational, and organizational minefield of countering terrorist radicalization and 
recruitment occurring in the United States.”158 This report and similar reports on the 
growing radicalization in the U.S. recommend that the best chances for responding to the 
“dynamic and diversified” domestic terrorism threat is to engage state and local law 
enforcement and public safety officials, as well as the general public.159  
Although there have been many reforms made in the domestic intelligence 
community since 9/11, there are many criticisms of the current structure of the system 
and the “top-down” approach to collecting and sharing intelligence. The FBI, with its 
JTTFs and FIGs, is primarily responsible for identifying and investigating terrorist 
threats. However, its reach does not go far beyond its field offices and major cities and 
urban areas. The smaller, local communities are not engaged in the intelligence process 
even though this is the area where extremist individuals are influenced and planning 
terrorist plots. There is no national counterterrorism (CT) doctrine that ensures that 
personnel at all levels of government, especially local law enforcement, are trained to 
recognize and address terrorist activity. Also, a CT doctrine would ensure that local law 
enforcement are engaged in the process by collecting and sharing information from 
within their own jurisdictions. Evaluating and restructuring the fusion process so that it is 
efficient, effective, and protective of civil liberties is also needed and not currently being 
implemented. Finally, a CT doctrine would outline these requirements and help alleviate 
the concerns of American citizens.  
B. CURRENT ROLE OF PUBLIC IN COMBATING DOMESTIC 
TERRORISM AND THE PUBLIC’S PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC 
TERRORISM 
The domestic terrorist threat is not only a concern for government and law 
enforcement agencies. Private citizens play significant roles in helping to recognize a true 
threat and actually combating domestic terrorism. Certain reports and studies have shown 
that the public has been instrumental in foiling terrorist plots and stopping attacks. The 
public has a key role to serve as the eyes and ears of law enforcement, who cannot be in 
158 Bergen, and Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, 20.  
159 Ibid. 
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all places at all times. The public is encouraged to be vigilant and report observed 
suspicious behaviors, and some members of the public accept the responsibility of 
selflessly taking actions to stop imminent threats and in the absence of law enforcement. 
However, in order continue to be successful and to maintain that vigilance, members of 
the public must remain informed and engaged players in the domestic intelligence 
environment so that they do not become complacent. 
With regard to fighting domestic terrorism, the public is the target audience for 
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) “If You See Something, Say Something” 
campaign. This campaign seeks to raise the public’s awareness of indicators of terrrorism 
and terrorism-related crime and report suspicious activities to local law enforcement. This 
campaign relies on an alert public to help keep communities safe and maintain open 
communications with authorities. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 
Initiative (NSI) is key to this campaign because the purpose of the NSI is to not only 
collect information, but to promote community outreach with an emphasis on explaining 
privacy policies and information-sharing systems to the public, as well as to ensure the 
public understands how and what to report to authorities. 
As a result of tips from the general public, synthesized with other reported 
suspicious activities, the NSI shares locally generated intelligence with federal, state, and 
local jurisdictions. According to a 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, 
“[m]any believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and the fusing 
of these reports with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots 
within the United States.”160 It is imperative that local law enforcement not only identify 
and report on suspicious activity but also share that information with fusion centers and 
joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs) in a timely manner.  
As explained earlier in this chapter, the NSI involves a five-step process: 
planning, gathering and processing, analysis, production and dissemination, and 
reevaluation. Once a suspicious activity is observed and reported in the SAR, the 
information is vetted by local law enforcement and shared with the state/local fusion 
160 Randol, Terrorism Information Sharing.  
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center for additional vetting and follow-up, as needed. The process allows the public to 
be engaged in the counter-terrorism process by providing information that local law 
enforcement and fusion centers share with key partners throughout the country to allow 
for analysis and identification of potential terrorist activities.  
There are many concerns surrounding suspicious activity reporting, especially the 
large amounts of information generated by the program. There are so many reports 
submitted, most of which may not have any significant implications or relevance to 
criminal activity, and some of which are duplicative. Once again, the privacy of the 
public must be considered, and the information submitted may be related to innocent 
behavior that has been misinterpreted. In response, the American Civil Liberties Union 
has initiated a lawsuit against the FBI for maintaining counter-terrorism files on five 
Americans who were the subject of SARs after engaging in “innocuous” activities.161 
Finally, the effectiveness of the NSI has never been measured, so the success of the 
program is questionable.  
Although it has not been highly publicized in the media or by law enforcement, to 
date, the public has played a key role in thwarting potential terrorist attacks. A 2010 
report from the American Security Project mentions that “civilian-provided intelligence” 
helped to open investigations in five cases162 to prevent attacks. Also, “direct civilian 
intervention” disrupted two plots163 that had not been discovered by existing 
counterterrorism strategies; namely, airport secuirty, and terrorism watch lists.164 
According to the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions 2010 study, approximately 40 
161 “Lawsuit Challenges Government’s ‘Suspicious Activity Report’ Program,” American Civil 
Liberties Union, July 10, 2014, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/lawsuit-challenges-governments-
suspicious-activity-report-program 
162 Lackawanna Six (2002); Fort Dix Plot (2007); James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj (2004); 
Michael Reynolds (2005); Portland Seven (2002–2003).  
163 Richard Reid, “Shoe Bomber” (2001); Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, “Underwear Bomber’ (2009). 
164 Germain Difo, “Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: An Assessment of Foiled Plots Since 




                                                 
percent of the 68 foiled attacks were stopped due to information provided by the 
public.165  
Interestingly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 2014 study of “active 
shooter” incidents revealed that private citizens are sometimes instrumental in stopping 
an active shooter.166 Although an active shooting incident is not always terrorism-related, 
this type of event causes chaos, fear, and intimidation similar to the havoc caused by a 
terrorist attack, especially when perpetrated by a lone wolf terrorist. Of the 160 incidents 
studied, unarmed citizens safely and successfully restrained the shooter in 21 incidents 
(13.1 percent).167 In five incidents (3.1 percent), the shooting ended after armed 
individuals, who were not law enforcement personnel and had a license to carry a 
firearm, engaged in gunfire with the shooters; killing three, wounding one, and one 
committed suicide.168 
The psychological impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) 
may have contributed to this inequitable concentration on Islamic extremists in the 
United States. Terrorist attacks and threats may “result in more severe psychological 
consequences than other types of traumatic events due to a perceived lack of control.”169 
The random nature and unpredictability of terrorist attacks and threats promote this lack 
of control and increase the perceived risk. Also, terrorism is a “purposeful act” that is 
“perceived to be perpetrated by a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group.”170 As a 
result, crime statistics show that there was in an increase in hate crimes immediately 
following the attacks on 9/11, and some communities experienced increased 
165 Strom et al., Building on Clues. 
166 Blair, and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 
2013. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid., 11. 
169 Adrienne S. Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, “Understanding the Psychological 
Consequences of Traumatic Events, Disasters and Terrorism” in Preparing for the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy, ed. Adrienne S. Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and 
Lewis R. Goldfrank, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003), 45.  
170 Ibid., 59. 
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discrimination, stigmatization, and anti-Muslim hate crimes.171 This perception that 
Muslims are a significant threat may have been further strengthened by the continuing 
media coverage of radicalized Islamic extremist-focused terrorist plots, either foiled 
attempts or alerts and warnings. However, this type of coverage is unsubstantiated and 
seems disproportionate to reality.  
The public seems unaware of or uninformed about the possible threats posed by 
non-Islamic domestic groups or lone wolves. Is this due to media spin? The attacks on 
9/11 were shown over and over by the media. Have the graphic images from that day 
caused the American public to fear Muslims because they are perceived to be the biggest 
threat to Americans? Is this perception reinforced by the continuing coverage by media of 
primarily Islamic extremist-focused threats and foiled plots, although there have been 
other incidents by domestic terror groups that have not received as much hype in the 
media? It is important to remember that “[h]uman beings are much more powerfully 
influenced by negative than by positive information.”172 As such, this perception of the 
threat of Muslim terrorist groups can and has spread throughout the country. 
Furthermore, it has developed into social amplification of these fears, the consequences 
of which are profiling of and negative bias toward Muslim-Americans, while neglecting 
what are perhaps the biggest threats—non-Islamic domestic terrorist groups and lone 
wolves. 
Recent reports of increased violence and threats relative to foreign terrorist 
groups, the Islamic State of Iraq, Syria/Islamic State of Iraq, the Levant (ISIS/ISIL), 
Khorosan, and a faction of al-Qaeda operating in Syria, seem to have contributed, once 
again, to growing fear of terrorism by Americans. According to an NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal poll, conducted September 2–7, 2014 of 500 registered voters, 47 percent feel the 
U.S. is less safe than it was before September 11, 2001, as opposed to 28 percent feeling 
less safe one year ago.173 A Pew Research Center poll of 2,002 adults nationwide, from 
171 Ibid. 
172 James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology 
of Mass-Mediated Fear” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, 
James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 122. 116–133 
173 “Terrorism,” 2014, accessed September 25, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm 
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September 2–9, 2014, showed that 53 percent were “very concerned” about the possible 
rise of Islamic extremism in the U.S., up from 36 percent in July 2011.174  
C. DRIVING FORCES 
The following factors are derived from reports, studies, and subject matter experts 
regarding common domestic intelligence activities in the United States today. These 
activities appeared prominently in the literature and are important keys to the detection 
and prevention of domestic terrorism plots. Their continuation or enhancement is 
expected to improve upon the overall U.S. domestic intelligence and investigation 
enterprise. 
1. Promoting Suspicious Activity Reporting 
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is key to the 
gathering of suspicious activities reported by the general public and businesses. Some 
reported activities may not appear to be significant initially, but when coupled with other 
information that is available in a nationwide database, these seemingly insignificant 
pieces of information can be instrumental in initiating investigations and/or foiling 
potential terrorist attacks. The intelligence gathered from NSI can be shared up and down 
the domestic intelligence community, but it starts in the local communities. Information-
sharing among all levels of government and among multiple disciplines is imperative to 
combating domestic terrorism because of three important factors: (1) a terrorist attack 
will happen in a local community and state and/or local first responders will be first on 
the scene, (2) terrorist plots and preparation occur within local communities where they 
are more likely to be observed by the general public and/or over 17,000 state and local 
law enforcement agencies, and (3) the compilation of multiple reports of seemingly 
unrelated suspicious activities is more likely to uncover a real crime or plot.175  
174 Ibid. 
175 Randol, Terrorism Information Sharing. 
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2. FBI as the U.S.’s Domestic Intelligence Agency 
Based on the increasing and evolving domestic terrorism threat over the past few 
years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has instituted improvements in an effort to 
make it the lead agency for countering the ever-changing domestic terrorism threat. Its 
enhanced resources include its 103 joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs), which identify, 
investigate, and follow up on terrorism leads; the newly reinstituted Intelligence Branch, 
charged with proactively assessing risks and collaborating with other intelligence-
collecting agencies; its Countering Violent Extremism Office, recently formed to work 
with federal partners and local communities to prevent violent extremists’ fund-raising 
and radicalization efforts; increased specialized training and exercise opportunities for 
law enforcement dealing with active shooter and mass casualty incidents; and the Field 
Intelligence Groups (FIGs) assigned to the 56 field offices to identify intelligence gaps 
and produce intelligence information reports. The FBI also works collaboratively with the 
National Network of Fusion Centers as well as local law enforcement. There is concern 
that the U.S.’s multiagency domestic intelligence system is not the most effective system. 
Other countries, such as Great Britain, Canada, Germany, and France, have one agency 
that handles the collection and analysis of domestic security threats. These agencies do 
not have powers of arrest, though, as the police handle this responsibility based on 
information from the domestic intelligence agency. With its reforms since 9/11 and its 
involvement with intelligence collection and dissemination as well as investigations, 
perhaps the FBI is best poised to be the one domestic intelligence agency. However, the 
FBI was initially an investigative and enforcement agency and, to be most effective, may 
have to relinquish its intelligence role.  
3. American Public as Observers and Enforcers 
Members of the American public can and has played a key role in foiling terrorist 
attempts in the U.S., and they should be included in the information sharing cycle so they 
are well-informed and can be the eyes and ears for local law enforcement. The public has 
been instrumental in helping to foil terrorist plots over the last several years. According 
to the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS) report, law enforcement and the 
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public are generally “the first line of defense in detecting terrorist plots” and were key to 
foiling over 80 percent of terrorist plots from 1999 to 2009.176 Terrorism expert Stephen 
Flynn also touted the importance of including the general public in efforts to combat 
domestic terrorism in his testimony before the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee 
on Homeland Security when he stated,  
In short, the changing nature of the threat reinforces further the imperative 
for the federal government to better inform and engage local public safety 
agencies and everyday Americans in helping to detect and prevent terrorist 
activities. Unfortunately, as this committee is well aware, there still 
remain serious issues with sharing information and providing quality 
counterterrorism training to local police. And we have a very long ways to 
go when it comes to engaging the American public.177  
The New America Foundation website contains a database on identified terror 
plots and what method was used to initiate investigations into those plots. For about one-
third of the homegrown jihadist extremists indicted or killed since 9/11 through October 
2014, family members of extremists and/or members of the Muslim community offered 
tips against them. In addition, suspicious activity reports aided in investigations of 
another nine percent of homegrown extremist cases.178 
4. Intelligence and Information Overload 
Domestic intelligence agencies may still have some issues sharing information, as 
the amount of information is simply too great for fusion centers or JTTFs to manage. This 
makes it even more important to have as many members of the intelligence environment 
as possible involved in collecting and reporting intelligence, including all local law 
enforcement and even the general public. Based on after-action assessments conducted on 
the Boston Marathon bombings and the Tsarnaev brothers’ backgrounds, there may have 
been an intelligence breakdown between the Boston JTTF and Boston Police Department 
in 2011 when Tamerlan Tsarnaev was first investigated. However, the Boston JTTF 
176 Strom et al., Building on Clues, 12. 
177 Assessing the Terrorism Threat (testiomny of Stephen Flynn), 4. 
178 “Terror Plots,” New America’s International Security Program, 2014, accessed November 2, 2014, 
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/terror-plots  
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conducted about 1,000 assessments that year, and the Tsarnaev case may not have 
warranted priority consideration or concern.179 There are simply not enough federal 
intelligence and law enforcement resources to process all of the data currently being 
collected, analyzed, and disseminated. In fact, wider dissemination and greater 
information-sharing are needed to help monitor and investigate the plethora of targeted 
individuals, reports, tips, and activities related to potential domestic terrorism threats. As 
estimated in the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee’s investigative report on the 
Boston Marathon bombings, there are only about 12,000 to 13,000 FBI agents worldwide 
and an estimated 800,000 local law enforcement officers in the U.S. to complement the 
efforts of federal law enforcement.180 
Fusion centers, originally established to improve the sharing of anti-terrorism 
information among federal, state, and local law enforcement, have taken on a much larger 
role. Not only do they fuse state and local information with federal threat intelligence, 
many (approximately 40 percent) take on an all-crimes and/or all-hazards mission. Is this 
too much responsibility for the fusion centers? They are trained and staffed for collection, 
analysis, and sharing terrorism-related information, and should focus on this effort for 
better efficiency and effectiveness. 
The review of the Boston Marathon bombings uncovered significant issues 
regarding the sharing of important risk-based information with local law enforcement. 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev had a history of radicalized behavior, was subject of a 2011 FBI-
initiated threat assessment, and traveled to Russia in 2012, yet this was unknown to local 
law enforcement in Tsarnaev’s own community. Local law enforcement officers are in 
the ideal position to collect and identify terrorist activities and should be considered the 
eyes and ears of the intelligence community. Members of the public can also assist with 
this effort, as they serve as additional eyes and ears of local law enforcement. The 
pressure, though, of reviewing and filtering all of this information, while conducting 
regular police work, remains a challenge for local law enforcement officers. Each local 
law enforcement agency’s responsibilities in the counterterrorism effort need to be 
179 Bergen et al., Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, 17–18. 
180 Majority Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, The Road to Boston. 
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formalized and must include officer training on how to recognize and synthesize key 
information to be shared, and maintain at least one counterterrorism point of contact 
within the community. This bottom-up strategy, similar to the United Kingdom’s Special 
Branches initiative, is the basis of a national counterterrorism doctrine. 
D. RESTRAINING FORCES 
The following section highlights areas of concern within the domestic intelligence 
arena. Because of these concerns, advocates are pushing for cutting back on the current 
domestic intelligence structure and initiatives. 
1. No One Domestic Intelligence Agency 
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 
greatly enhanced its intelligence capabilities since 9/11 and uses its joint terrorism task 
forces (JTTFs) and field intelligence groups (FIGs) to develop relationships with 
counterterrorism officials on the local level. In addition, DHS has an Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and supports state and urban area fusion centers, both of 
which receive and share terrorism-related information with the local level. Although 
other countries function with one agency responsible for the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of intelligence, the overlapping, but separate missions of DOJ and DHS 
make it difficult to maintain one, intelligence-focused agency in the United States. Even 
with all of these resources, there are formal and informal restrictions on fully sharing 
information down to the local level. As outlined above, there are cases, such as the 
Boston Marathon bombings, where it was revealed that not all risk and threat assessment 
information was shared by the FBI/JTTF with local law enforcement, who needed this 
information to possibly recognize potential terrorist threats. A national counterterrorism 
doctrine would identify each agency’s role, address any overlap, and ensure that the local 
level drives intelligence-sharing and collaboration. Perhaps DOJ’s recently re-established 
Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee could contribute to the doctrine by clarifying 
the profile of domestic terrorism in the U.S., to include intelligence collection on 
domestic terrorist groups, foreign terrorist organizations, and homegrown individuals. 
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2. Public Perceptions 
Is the domestic terrorist threat as serious as represented to the American public? 
According to a September 2014 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of a small sample of 
registered voters (approximately 500), 47 percent of respondents feel less safe now than 
they did before September 11, 2001, as opposed to 28 percent reporting feeling less safe 
only a year earlier, in September 2013.181 The devastation and impressions resulting from 
9/11 are perhaps still at work. Political scientist John Mueller admits, “there is a great 
deal in dramatic first impressions: once a perceived threat is thoroughly implanted in the 
public consciousness, it can become internalized and accepted as a fact of life.”182 If the 
threat is truly not there and the American public and government eventually become no 
longer concerned about a threat, then this will significantly impact budgets and funding 
for domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies.    
3. National Threat Assessments 
The last National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on terrorism was completed in 
2007. The DHS I&A published two threat assessments in 2009 on left- and right-wing 
extremists. It was not until September 2012 that the FBI released a National Terrorism 
Assessment on Domestic Terrorism. Also, DHS downsized its team that focused on non-
Islamic domestic terror a few years ago. The lack of overall assessments and continual 
updated assessments on domestic terrorism implies that the threat is not a priority and 
resources are being reduced. However, in 2014, both the DHS I&A and the FBI 
published national domestic terrorism assessments and DOJ reestablished its Domestic 
Terrorism Executive Committee. Perhaps domestic terrorism is reemerging as a priority 
in 2014. 
4. Fusion Centers and Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 
Are fusion centers operating as originally intended? Initially, fusion centers were 
established to share terrorist-related information among state, local, tribal, and federal 
181 “Terrorism,” 2014, accessed September 25, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm 
182 Mueller, Overblown, 89. 
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law enforcement. However, many fusion centers have expanded their roles to include all 
hazards and/or all crimes. The missions and rules implemented by fusion centers vary 
among jurisdictions, based on the needs and priorities of the given community. 
Statements by the Heritage Foundation raise concerns that fusion centers are too “federal-
centric.”183 It claims that there are not enough resources, such as training and technology 
tools, supporting the 70+ fusion centers throughout the country. As a result, the centers 
are merely “data providers” and do not have the capabilities to conduct comprehensive 
analysis and intelligence work.184 Also, the expanded role of fusion centers may be 
diluting their effectiveness in dealing with domestic terrorism because their focus has 
been diverted to other crimes and emergencies. After conducting a two-year examination 
of fusion centers and their intelligence products, a bipartisan report by the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, released in 2012, revealed that “DHS-assigned detailees 
to the fusion centers forwarded ‘intelligence’ of uneven quality—oftentimes shoddy, 
rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, 
occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not 
unrelated to terrorism.”185 Sustainment is also becoming an issue, as fusion centers are 
primarily funded with DHS grant funds. Budget constraints may limit or eventually 
eliminate this significant support for Fusion Centers. 
There are also concerns by such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) as to the type of information being collected on American citizens and the 
collection methods. The ACLU asserts that fusion centers are “policy shopping” and that 
a fusion center that is prohibited from collecting certain data by state privacy or open 
records laws can obtain this data from other states’ fusion centers that are not restricted 
by these stringent laws. Also, fusion center analysts are not subject to the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Extreme secrecy is another issue in that information 
183 Matt A. Mayer, “What is the Terrorism Threat Now? Too Federal-Centric,” The New York Times, 
Opinion page, March 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/10/what-is-the-terrorism-
threat-now/counterterrorism-is-too-federal-centric 
184 Ibid.  
185 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and 
Local Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2012), 1.  
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is over-classified that limits the dissemination of important domestic terrorism 
information, ultimately defeating the very purpose of fusion centers: collaboration and 
information-sharing. The ACLU is also concerned about violation of the Posse Comitatus 
Act and conflicts of interests with military and private sector participation, 
respectively.186  
A key component of the Fusion Centers Network is the Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative, which has also come under fire by the ACLU. In July 2014, 
the ACLU of California, the national ACLU, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-
Asian Law Caucus filed a lawsuit, Gill v. DOJ, challenging the legality of the SAR 
program. According to the ACLU, “[t]his domestic surveillance program wrongly targets 
First Amendment-protected activities, encourages racial and religious profiling, and 
violates federal law,” such as DOJ’s own requirement of having “reasonable suspicion” 
of criminal activity before collecting information on someone.187 On the contrary, the 
SAR program only requires documenting behaviors that “may be indicative” of terrorism 
planning “or other illicit intention.”188 This lawsuit emphasizes the fact that DHS and 
DOJ have not made changes to the SAR program since a 2012 bipartisan Senate 
subcommittee report189 and a 2013 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report,190 both of which highlighted the failures of the SAR program and provided 
recommendations to DHS for improving the effectiveness of fusion centers and the SAR 
program. 
The above information provides an overview of the current structure of the 
domestic intelligence enterprise. According to lessons learned from recent domestic 
terrorism incidents, such as the Boston Marathon bombings, there are still gaps in 
186 German, and Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? 
187 “Lawsuit Challenges Government’s ‘Suspicious Activity Report’ Program.” 
188 Ibid 
189 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and 
Local Fusion Centers. 
190 Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing: Additional Actions Could Help Ensure 
that Efforts to Share Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity Reports are Effective (GAO-13-233) 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-233 
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communications and information-sharing between the federal government and local law 
enforcement. Key information collection tools, such as state and urban area fusion centers 
and suspicious activity reports, appear necessary, but have issues surrounding privacy 
protection and civil liberties. Most importantly, the engagement of the general public and 
local community organizations has not been realized to date. Furthermore, there is 
currently no national counterterrorism doctrine to prioritize and address these gaps. 
In the following chapter, there will be analysis of the driving and restraining 
forces concerning both the domestic terrorism threat and the current issues and challenges 
with domestic terrorism intelligence. The prevailing findings from the cited reports, 




So far, this thesis has reviewed the evolution of domestic terrorism in the United 
States, from the definitions of domestic terrorism and variations of similar offenses, to 
the beginnings of domestic terrorism in this country, through today’s prevailing domestic 
terrorist threats. The current structure, challenges, and advantages of the domestic 
intelligence system have also been outlined. Following is analysis, based on the weight of 
both the driving and restraining forces identified earlier in this thesis for both claims: 1.) 
Domestic terrorist threat in the United States is growing, and 2.) Domestic intelligence 
agencies are not sufficiently collaborating or focusing on the magnitude and shifting 
forces behind the emerging domestic terrorist threat in the United States. 
A. DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES IS 
GROWING  
Over the past several years, the domestic terrorist threat has not been a critical 
issue for Congress; federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement and intelligence 
officials; the media; or even the general public. There have been some high profile and 
shocking domestic terrorist plots and successful attacks within the U.S., such as the 
bombings in Oklahoma City and, more recently, at the Boston Marathon. However, it is 
the international terrorist threats from Islamic extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which have been highlighted more in the media 
and addressed more through new statutes, policies, and funding from Congress. This is 
supported by the fact that no formal intelligence analysis on domestic terrorism was 
completed since the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis Department (DHS I&A) report in 2009 and, in fact, DHS I&A had reduced 
intelligence staffing responsible for collecting and reporting on non-Islamic domestic 
terrorist threat. The Department of Justice (DOJ) had also scaled down its focus on 
domestic terrorism. The media highlighted the war on terrorism in the Middle East, but 
not as much on the plots and attacks perpetrated by non-Islamic extremists within the 
U.S.  
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In 2014, though, the trend seems to be shifting and the domestic terrorist threat is 
being taken more seriously. DOJ has reinstated its Domestic Terrorism Executive 
Committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the DHS I&A both released national 
threat assessments on the domestic terrorism threat. Their focus was on the more violent 
actions and messaging from the non-Islamic, anti-government patriot groups, such as the 
Sovereign Citizens and militias. The threat from violent Islamic extremists in the U.S. is 
also being highlighted during 2014 Congressional hearings, such as that of Jihadist Safe 
Havens: Efforts to Detect and Deter Terrorist Travel,191 which targeted the flow of 
foreign fighters to and from Syria.  
In the U.S. today, there is an increased threat of domestic terrorism, and terrorist 
activities have become more violent and deadly. According to the published statistics of 
violent domestic terrorist events, the most successful type of terrorist over the past 
decade, and seemingly the most immediate threat, is the lone wolf offender; one who acts 
on his/her own without being currently involved with a structured terrorist organization. 
Anti-government groups, such as the Sovereign Citizens and militias, have also carried 
out high profile violent actions in recent years, which makes them a major concern for 
law enforcement. The newest addition to the contemporary domestic terrorism threat is 
the emergence of homegrown violent extremists and radicalized foreign fighters.  
Because of unclear definitions, it is difficult at times to differentiate between 
domestic terrorism and violent extremism. Depending upon the charges filed in each 
case, the manner in which a case is classified and handled by law enforcement and the 
judicial system differs. A clear definition of domestic terrorism and an understanding of 
the current threat are needed to establish the “big picture” of the domestic terrorism 
threat. From the non-Islamic extremist groups to the returning foreign fighters who have 
undergone radicalization, all groups must be recognized as a threat, and a plan for 
managing that threat must be established and implemented. 
The growing number of successful attacks by lone wolves, who are also known 
primarily as active shooters, is also a concern. Lone wolves are most often identified as 
191 Jihadist Sanctuaries in Syria and Iraq (testimony of Seth G. Jones). 
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the most serious threats in testimony, studies, and reports concerning domestic terrorism 
and active shooters. It is likely that because of this demonstration of success by lone 
wolves and law enforcement’s designation of lone wolves as the most dangerous threat, 
that the ruthless and formidable terrorist group, ISIS, has taken to social media to recruit 
violent extremist followers to conduct lone wolf attacks against U.S. and its Western 
allies, specifically, military and law enforcement officials. This method appears to be 
effective and may have prompted the October 2014 attacks by lone wolves, in New York 
City and Canada, who are suspected to have been inspired by ISIS.192 
A strong connection to lone wolf attacks is the radicalization process, which is 
reinforced by social media. International and national terrorist groups are active on social 
media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and anti-government websites and blogs. Counter-
radicalization efforts in the U.S. do not address this successful radicalization method by 
presenting counter arguments or messaging to educate and engage the public regarding 
terrorist groups and their murderous, extremist ideas.   
B. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
COLLABORATING OR FOCUSING ON THE MAGNITUDE AND 
SHIFTING FORCES BEHIND THE EMERGING DOMESTIC 
TERRORIST THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES  
A national domestic intelligence collection effort that focuses on violent jihadist 
extremism, as well as right- and left-wing extremism, is needed. Also, the roles and 
192 Martin Couture-Rouleau of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, was killed by law enforcement after 
he struck and killed two members of the Canadian Armed Forces with his car. A friend of Couture-
Rouleau’s suggested that he had carried out the attack in response to an appeal by IS for jihadists across the 
world to carry out ‘lone wolf’ attacks on westerners. Jack Moore, “Canada Raises Terror Threat Level 
Because of Isis ‘Lone Wolf’ Attack on Two Soldiers,” International Business Times, October 22, 2014, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/canada-raises-terror-threat-level-because-isis-lone-wolf-attack-two-soldiers-
1471223 
Also in Canada, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau’s fatal shooting attack on a soldier guarding the national war 
memorial, storming of parliament while armed, may have been “driven by ideological and political 
motives,” according to police. Rob Gillies, “Gunman in Canada Attack Prepared Video of Himself,” Yahoo 
News, October 26, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/gunman-canada-attack-prepared-video-himself-
234721558.html 
Zale H. Thompson, a converted Muslim and self-radicalized individual, attacked four New York City 
police officers with a hatchet. Shimon Prokupecz, and Kevin Conlon, “NYPD: Hatchet Attack an Act of 
Terror,” CNN, November 5, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/24/us/new-york-police-
attacked/index.html 
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responsibilities of the federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to identify and counter 
radicalization must be clearly defined. Homegrown terrorists continue to form throughout 
the country and the local police and public need the proper information to be vigilant and 
proactive.  
As recommended by the National Security Preparedness Group in 2011, although 
there are many counter-radicalization efforts in existence, they are not coordinated to 
ensure that they are being used efficiently, information is not being shared up, down, and 
across intelligence agencies, and intelligence is not shared in a timely manner, especially 
at the local level.193 Every community should have a counterterrorism point of contact to 
ensure information-sharing and that information is shared both up and down. “Balance” 
is a key concept that is not evident in counter-radicalization and counterterrorism efforts 
in the U.S. Intelligence efforts and processes are top-heavy, as the federal government 
has investigative powers that allow it to acquire intelligence that is not always available 
to or shared with local law enforcement. Also, the process includes primarily public 
safety agencies but does not integrate key partners from other disciplines, such as faith-
based, community leaders, and public health. Counter-radicalization strategies should 
also use a “balanced-power approach” with all levels of government incorporating both 
hard-power and soft-power tactics to work with and focus on communities that are 
targeted by terrorists for radicalization and recruitment.194   
One of the key methods for the collection and analysis of local and state-level 
intelligence and information is through the National Network of Fusion Centers. This 
information-sharing network was established to analyze and synthesize local intelligence 
efforts. All 70+ state and major urban area fusion centers are required to achieve and 
sustain a minimum level of capabilities that have been established by the federal 
government. However, many fusion centers are not performing as designed and no formal 
evaluation of the fusion centers’ impact on the situational awareness of terrorist threats 
has been completed to date. Another resource in the domestic intelligence effort is the 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), an effort that has generated 
193 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. 
194 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism.”  
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large amounts of information and intelligence data, but also a resource that has not been 
formally evaluated to demonstrate its success. One overall concern that may be limiting 
the success and efficiency of domestic intelligence efforts is the overabundance of 
information, which is sometimes duplicative and irrelevant. Also, the collection and 
analysis of this type of information raise concerns about the protections of civil liberties 
and privacy. 
Today’s domestic terrorism threat in the U.S. shows a drop in the number of 
active patriot and hate groups, yet there are more violent acts carried out by these groups, 
particularly against law enforcement. An added concern that has emerged most recently 
is the threat from Western violent extremists who have traveled to and are inspired by 
international terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, particularly the Islamic State. Their 
return to the U.S., and potential dangerousness upon their return, must be tracked and 
addressed. The research has shown that the most successful and likely most dangerous 
domestic terrorist attack is perpetrated by the lone wolf. Lone-wolf offenders, who are 
often undetectable because they are usually not associated with a known terrorist group, 
have acted out their extremist beliefs with violent acts against law enforcement and other 
innocent bystanders. In addition, lone offenders are also closely associated with crimes 
perpetrated by active shooters and returning foreign fighters. All of the above-mentioned 
issues can be addressed in a national counterterrorism policy in conjunction with a 
counter-radicalization strategy, including bottom-up information-sharing, training to 
strengthen and focus intelligence collection efforts, and culturally sensitive and engaging 
messaging to counter extremist propaganda and influence on social media and the 
Internet. 
The final chapter outlines recommendations for addressing these issues and an 
implementation strategy. In addition, it identifies challenges to be considered when 
addressing the issues. Finally, some issues have been recommended for additional 
research, such as profiling the lone wolf terrorist, because current resources were found 
to be limited. 
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This thesis has focused on the domestic terrorist threat to the homeland and the 
roles and responsibilities of the key players in the domestic intelligence and investigation 
arenas. After reviewing the many opinions and viewpoints found in the above mentioned 
reports, studies, assessments, polls, and testimonies of terrorism experts and 
representatives from public and private entities, there were some common themes and 
recommendations that should be considered when addressing and combating domestic 
terrorism. The domestic terrorism situation in the United States is dynamic and 
encompasses far more threats and extremist groups than it has in the past. Also, these 
groups are more violent; their plots are hatched in local communities throughout the U.S., 
and their members and followers are not always known to law enforcement although they 
live, work, attend school, and belong to faith organizations within local communities. 
Therefore, it is necessary for local law enforcement, the general public, and local 
organizations to be vigilant and aware of warning signs of potential domestic terrorism 
activity, recruiting, and interest within their own communities. 
Combating the domestic terrorist threat is complex and requires additional 
analysis and attention from those entities most involved with the prevention, detection, 
investigation, interdiction, and mitigation of domestic terrorism in the U.S. These entities 
include the federal government, particularly Congress, which is responsible for 
developing laws, regulations and penalties relative to domestic terrorist activities; the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to conduct 
prosecutions, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to identify, prevent and 
investigate domestic terrorism groups and individuals; and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to acquire and share intelligence, and protect U.S. borders from 
unauthorized entry of known and suspected terrorists. Other targeted partners in the fight 
against terrorism include state and urban area fusion centers to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate domestic terrorism intelligence to federal, state, and local partners. Local law 
enforcement are partners responsible for protecting the public from terrorism by 
observing and investigating suspicious behavior, and conducting outreach activities to 
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gain community trust and connections. As a partner, the general public must remain 
vigilant in reporting suspicious activities and, under certain circumstances, deter terrorist 
activities when the opportunity arises and it is safe to do so. An engaged and informed 
citizenry is in fact a great force multiplier for prevention and resiliency of communities.  
The following sections contain recommendations concerning the above mentioned 
entities’ roles in truly understanding the scope of the domestic terrorism threat and 
improving the overall capacity to respond to that threat. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION PLAN 
The domestic terrorism enterprise comprises federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement and intelligence officials; the military; the private sector, including for-profit 
and non-profit businesses; human service agencies, such as mental health and social 
services; faith-based organizations; and the general public. A working group, consisting 
of representatives from each of these entities should be established to prepare an action 
plan and timeline for developing and implementing a formal, national counterterrorism 
(CT) doctrine in the U.S. The doctrine must identify the roles of the federal, state, tribal, 
and local intelligence agencies and create a necessary and acceptable balance between the 
responsibilities of federal agencies and local law enforcement. Specifically, the doctrine 
should define how information-sharing and relationships should be managed and 
maintained between the key intelligence players. As a “community,” intelligence 
agencies must agree on what intelligence should be collected and for what purposes and 
document this in the CT doctrine. The CT doctrine’s theme should be that of a bottom-up 
approach, recognizing that low level threats from homegrown terrorist plots within local 
communities must be the priority. In order for it to be successful, federal agencies must 
ensure that local police departments are included in the intelligence loop and 
investigative activities. 
The overall focus of the CT doctrine should be on managing, not eliminating, the 
domestic terrorism risk. The goal of domestic terrorism policy should be on how the FBI 
can manage risk associated with domestic terrorism incidents. Domestic terrorism has 
existed for over 150 years, and it is has only grown and become more violent over that 
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time. Moreover, it is unlikely that it will completely disappear. The goal of the fight 
against domestic terrorism should be that of mitigation, not prevention. There is simply 
not enough funding to prevent and respond to every domestic terror event. This is 
especially true given the successes of lone wolf offenders, who most experts agree are the 
most dangerous and difficult to detect in advance.  
Below are components and recommendations must be considered and 
incorporated into the CT doctrine.  
1. Common Operating Picture or Big Picture Overview  
As mentioned in this thesis, national assessments and intelligence reports 
concerning domestic terrorism have been few and far between. The standard is the 
national intelligence estimate (NIE), created by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. The NIE provides a clear picture of the current situation in its entirety and 
provides long-term projections of how the situation will change over the next several 
years. Traditionally, NIEs have been used to assess the foreign threat, but an NIE for the 
domestic threat is currently needed. The NIE and its key judgments would be the baseline 
for the federal stakeholders to develop a comprehensive CT doctrine that outlines the 
responsibilities of all levels of government, the key CT activities that need to be 
implemented and maintained, and performance measures for gauging progress and 
making strategic adjustments over time. The strategy must be developed and shared with 
all levels of government so that everyone has the same information, the same methods 
and timelines for communications, and overall objectives for addressing the current and 
anticipated domestic terrorism threats. A comprehensive and coordinated report of the 
long-term potential of this threat is needed so that the FBI, fusion centers, and local law 
enforcement can plan and coordinate. 
The National Network of Fusion Centers and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative can also contribute to establishing a common operating picture. First, 
formal evaluations of each of these resources must be completed in order to ensure their 
operating status and efficiency are at optimal levels for combating domestic terrorism.  
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a. Recommendation 1: Develop a National Intelligence Estimate Focused 
on Domestic Terrorism 
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) must develop a new national 
intelligence estimate on domestic terrorism. The last NIE on terrorism, entitled, “The 
Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” was issued in July 2007 and primarily focused 
on the international terrorist threat.195 In order to develop the NIE, all federal, state, and 
local agencies involved with the identification, analysis, investigation of and response to 
domestic terrorist threats must share facts and information to develop a common 
operating picture of the domestic terrorism threat today and the implications for the 
future. Because the role of law enforcement and continued cooperation and input by 
American citizens is necessary in the fight against domestic terrorism, the NIE’s key 
judgments should be declassified. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the 
agency primarily responsible for gathering intelligence on domestic terrorism, and has the 
trained intelligence staff to collect information from other federal, state, and local 
intelligence sources and analyze available information, and collaborate with the Office of 
the DNI to make key judgments.  
b. Recommendation 2: Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative on Countering Domestic 
Terrorism 
There is a concern about the effectiveness of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). In order to address this, the SARs should be tracked 
and documented as to their ultimate use. A quantitative and qualitative metric, developed 
to determine effectiveness in terms of prevention and/or early warning, is warranted. As 
identified in the 2011 Congressional Research Service report on NSI, other than the 
number of SARs produced and the number of SARs shared, there is not an effective way 
to accurately measure results.196 Quantification alone is in large measure useless absent a 
qualitative assessment of actual operational results. Originally, the NSI was a well-
conceived and viable idea for the collection and analysis of terrorism-related SARs, but it 
195 National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. 
Homeland (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). 
196 Randol, Terrorism Information Sharing. 
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has lost its focus due to redundant and irrelevant information. The agency most 
appropriate for developing an evaluation plan for the NSI is the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance’s (BJA) NSI Program Management Office (PMO). The PMO was established 
in March 2010 and is responsible for coordinating NSI efforts among all levels of 
government.197 
c. Recommendation 3: Evaluate the Effectiveness of Fusion Centers in 
Combating Domestic Terrorism 
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A) must conduct a formal evaluation of the effectiveness and outcomes of 
fusion centers, and produce recommended organizational changes. DHS has supported 
and primed the National Network Fusion Centers to establish a collaborative intelligence 
collection and analysis capability focusing on domestic terrorism. Based on evaluation 
outcomes, the ideal situation would be for fusion centers to revert to their original 
purpose and focus only on CT efforts so that comprehensive data collection and analysis 
may be completed at the state and local level. This “back to basics” approach would 
allow intelligence personnel to focus on domestic terrorism and receive the training and 
tools to fulfill this objective.  
A formal assessment of state and major urban area fusion centers can begin with 
the results of the annual baseline capabilities assessment (BCA) process in which each 
fusion center must participate. Fusion centers are greatly dependent on federal grant 
assistance from DHS and grant funds must address capability gaps identified in the BCA. 
Under the Homeland Security Grant Program funding guidelines, clear measurements 
and reporting methods have been imposed for states and urban areas to gauge their 
progress in improving fusion center capabilities. DHS I&A has developed a Fusion 
Center Performance Program to collect standardized data and “evaluate the value and 
impact of individual fusion centers and the national network as a whole in supporting 
197 Ibid., 17. 
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national information sharing and homeland security outcomes.”198 However, there are no 
published results from this program to date. 
In response to concerns about privacy rights and civil liberties, an organizational 
change for fusion centers involves the standardization of operational procedures, training 
for staff, and consent to abide by Freedom of Information Act laws and open government 
requirements. Ongoing evaluation of fusion centers will be more useful with standard 
operational procedures in place. 
2. Training Plan 
A comprehensive CT doctrine should also outline standardized and ongoing 
training for intelligence analysts and local law enforcement to improve intelligence 
capabilities and efficiencies.  
a. Recommendation 4: Develop and Implement a Counterterrorism 
Training Plan 
A comprehensive CT doctrine must include training standards for all levels of 
government to ensure that personnel are trained to identify and synthesize the key types 
of intelligence. In support of the CT effort, training must be offered to state and local 
government personnel to improve skills in the areas of engagement, outreach, and 
cultural competency. Training for local law enforcement should also emphasize how to 
identify and follow-up on general crime investigations that may lead to terrorist plots.  
The CT training plan must support funding for additional and standardized 
training/certification of intelligence analysts regarding information collection, analysis, 
and dissemination; basic training for local law enforcement officers to recognize reported 
or observed suspicious behaviors as significant enough to complete suspicious activity 
reports; standardization of staffing, policies and procedures among federal, state, and 
local domestic intelligence agencies; legal reviews to ensure the protection of privacy 
rights and civil liberties; and other necessary tools to the domestic intelligence enterprise 
for the implementation of a robust domestic terrorist response operation.  
198 Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP),” August 19, 
2014, accessed October 27, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-performance-program-fcpp 
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3. Community Outreach, Engagement, and Awareness  
If members of the general public are going to play a role in combating domestic 
terrorism, then members must be able to understand the current terrorism situation in the 
country and terrorism indicators within their own communities. State and local 
government personnel must establish solid relations with local communities so they can 
obtain important information that may help identify radicalization and other suspicious 
activities. As discovered in the investigation into the Boston Marathon bombings, 
members of the community and community organizations are in the best position to 
notice terrorist threats, and they should be constantly reminded to be vigilant in observing 
and reporting suspicious behavior. The DHS Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
(SAR) Initiative (NSI) should continue its Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) 
initiative, which supports local law enforcement and fusion centers when interacting with 
their local communities to explain the SAR process, the purpose of the NSI, the role of 
fusion centers, and the steps taken to ensure privacy. 
a. Recommendation 5: Engage the American Public in the Intelligence 
Process 
DHS has attempted to engage the American public in combating terrorism with 
the “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign. Members of the American public 
can and have played a key role in foiling terrorist attempts in the U.S., and they should be 
included in the information sharing cycle so they are well-informed and can be the eyes 
and ears for local law enforcement. Providing clear and detailed information to the public 
regarding terrorist groups and/or threats not only promotes trust, but empowers the public 
by providing them with a substantial role in the “war on terrorism.”  
If the government, via the media, clearly defines the risks and the realistic 
possibilities for the public, it will most likely quell the spread of rumors and panic. 
Because the media have such a major impact on influencing the public’s perception of 
terrorism, it will be necessary for the media to “frame” the message about domestic 
terrorism in a manner that promotes public trust, awareness, and capability. This may be 
accomplished once government agencies and leaders develop strong relations with the 
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media that would allow them to provide accurate and timely information to the public and 
engage in “full public discourse” to counter “rumors, misinformation, and distrust.”199 
Another method for engaging the public and mitigating their perception of lack of 
control is to include them in the intelligence process, which has historically been 
restrictive due, perhaps, to the over-classification of information. With regard to 
intelligence, the public is already involved at the beginning of the process through 
submission of suspicious activity reports. The public’s role ends at that point of the 
process, but its assistance may be instrumental later in the process as well. Once the 
information is submitted, analyzed, and shared with other federal, state, and local 
intelligence agencies, the findings, if any, should be shared with members of the public 
so they, too, are more aware of possible threats and the extent of those threats. This 
would allow members of the public to assess the actual risk to themselves and family 
members, make choices on whether or not to act on the findings, and not be as fearful of 
the “unknown” threat. The NIE’s key judgments, if unclassified, would satisfy the 
public’s involvement at the tail end of the intelligence process. As recommended above, 
the NIE should be a source of information for the public, as well as for domestic 
intelligence agencies, to effectively combat domestic terrorism. 
b. Recommendation 6: Continue to Educate the American Public about 
Domestic Terrorism Risks and Threats 
Congress can and should take the positive role of educating the public and issues 
groups about the role of domestic intelligence agencies. It is important that the 
Congressional Homeland Security Committees continue to hold domestic terrorism 
hearings, and they must include profiles of all domestic terrorist threats, from both 
Islamic and non-Islamic extremist groups, so that the public may be educated and aware.  
This effort will promote public trust and enhance members of the public’s feelings 
of being in control of the situation. This, along with engagement of state and local law 
199 Breckenridge, and Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism,” 128.  
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enforcement and public safety officials, is truly the country’s best chance for responding 
to the “dynamic and diversified” domestic terrorism threat.200 
DHS must also take a lead in implementing proposed changes to focus on 
domestic terrorism and engaging the public. It should collaborate with the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and its components, including joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs), FBI field 
offices, and with representatives from local law enforcement, to ensure that all local 
communities have at least one counterterrorism point of contact who will be informed 
and act as liaison with federal, state, and local intelligence agencies, as well as local 
community members and organizations. 
4. Funding for Implementation 
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice currently 
provide grant funding for all of the above-mentioned activities. State agencies determine 
and justify the investments they will make with their federal grant funds, and it may be 
for targeting threats other than from domestic terrorist groups, based on state risk 
assessments of their population, key resources, and critical infrastructure. However, funds 
are becoming scarce due to budget constraints, and Congress may have to earmark funds 
specifically for CT initiatives and evaluations. A critical and expensive piece of the CT 
doctrine is the continued funding for the operation of state and urban area fusion centers.  
a. Recommendation 7: Continue Funding to Promote Transparency and 
Inclusion in the National Network of Fusion Centers 
The DHS I&A’s Directorate of Plans, Policy, and Performance Management must 
drive new policies and procedures that incorporate the expansion of disciplines engaged 
in fusion center activities to include Congress and the public. Although there are concerns 
that the military and private sector involvement in fusion centers is a conflict of interest, 
the implementation of standard policies and procedures, clear definitions of roles and 
responsibilities, and transparency in the fusion process will formalize and justify their 
presence. Military and private sector personnel should continue to participate in fusion 
200 Bergen, and Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, 31. 
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centers to provide subject matter and analytical expertise relative to domestic terrorism 
and critical infrastructure protection. Fusion centers are primarily supported with federal 
homeland security grant funds and this funding should continue, contingent upon the 
fusion centers meeting established operational and training standards. 
5. Implement Strategy to Prevent Radicalization and Violent Extremism  
Although in 2011 the White House published the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism201 and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,202 there has been no follow 
through and there continues to be gaps in information-sharing and failures in identifying 
dangerous, radicalized individuals. Counter-radicalization is aimed at empowering 
communities to be resilient and to protect them against recruitment, whereas CT targets 
the identification and prevention of terrorists. In response to the CT and counter-
radicalization issues, every police department should designate a CT point of contact to 
work with the local fusion center and JTTFs concerning intelligence and information-
sharing. This can be accomplished through additional training and shifting of some duties 
within small and large police departments, and it would ensure that the terrorist threat 
“big picture” is clear to as many law enforcement agencies as possible. This is also 
necessary to establish and fulfill a counter-radicalization strategy. 
a. Recommendation 8: Empower Local Law Enforcement in the 
Identification and Mitigation of the Emerging Threat from Foreign 
Fighters 
Detection and deterrence of radicalized “foreign fighters” traveling to and from 
the U.S. must also be a priority. In his testimony before the Committee on Homeland 
Security, Seth Jones urged legislators to develop and implement policies and procedures 
in the U.S. to help detect violent extremists, both U.S. citizens and other Western 
nationalities, who are entering and/or returning to this country after training and fighting 
201 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 
202 The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan. 
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with rebel organizations overseas.203 It is also important to reduce the number of Western 
foreign fighters who are traveling overseas to receive training and fighting with al-Qaeda 
and other Salafi jihadist groups. Jones’s recommendations reinforce the need for the U.S. 
to strengthen intelligence collection efforts as well as empower local law enforcement. 
With regard to the former, the recommendation is that foreign and domestic intelligence 
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
Administration, DHS, and the FBI, must be able to collect, analyze, and disseminate both 
signals and human intelligence on individuals traveling to and from Syria in order to 
ensure that they are properly added to watch lists. Jones’s second recommendation 
concerning foreign fighters is to replicate the United Kingdom’s practice of assigning a 
coordinating officer in local police departments.204 This type of resource already exists in 
most large, urban area police departments in the U.S., yet smaller departments do not 
have this dedicated resource. There are several examples of domestic terrorist cells and 
plots that originated and operated in small town America.   
b. Recommendation 9: Participate In and Monitor Social Media and the 
Internet 
Many domestic terrorist groups described in this thesis have successfully used 
social media and the Internet to recruit and inspire radicals, as well as raise funds for their 
training, exercises, weapons, and travel needed to implement their plots. The U.S. has the 
ability to promote CT and counter-radicalization campaigns via the same media. All 
levels of government and businesses have public affairs officials who access and post to 
the same social media sites and resources that terrorist organizations frequent. Agency 
public affairs personnel should devise and implement a media campaign to counter 
claims made by terrorist organizations, and promote the agencies’ outreach policies, 
activities, and events that would appeal to the general public. The media campaign should 
also invite feedback and ideas from social media users so that they are engaged in CT and 
counter-radicalization efforts. Due to their significant influence on the public, national 
print, and television media should also be enrolled in CT and counter-radicalization 
203 Jihadist Sanctuaries in Syria and Iraq (testimony of Seth G. Jones).  
204 Ibid.  
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campaigns. Federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
must continue to monitor social networking and Internet sights to be current on who is 
being targeted for radicalization and what geographic areas are being targeted. Also, 
these sites can inform all users about who and what areas are most in danger of being 
targeted for attacks by terrorist groups. 
B. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many of the above recommendations can begin immediately, but not all are easily 
fulfilled. Several create challenges for the government as well as the general public. 
Primarily, the impacts of the above recommendations on the general public are the 
greatest concern. Specifically, sacrificing the protection of privacy and civil liberties and 
the safety of the American public may be an undesirable result. 
With regard to privacy and civil liberties, the collection and analysis of 
intelligence and information sharing causes the greatest concern for civil rights groups. 
The American Civil Liberties Union has filed a lawsuit, Gill v. Department of Justice, 
questioning the legality of the Suspicious Activity Reporting program. In addition, it 
continues to implore Congress and the federal government to make changes to the 
National Network of Fusion Centers without endangering the country’s security.205 
Recommendations include a comprehensive evaluation of these programs and ensuring 
some form of due process when collecting information on civilians. 
The American public can continue to play a key role in implementing the 
anticipated recommendations listed above. The public has proven itself to be beneficial in 
foiling domestic terrorist plots and should become more engaged in the response to 
domestic terrorism. The public may satisfy this role by being observant and reporting 
suspicious behavior, and by interceding to stop a terrorist attack when the threat is 
imminent, the opportunity exists, and emergency personnel are not yet available to 
respond. However, both of these options are risky for civilians, who may have legitimate 
concerns about retaliation from subjects for which suspicious behavior has been reported, 
leading to an investigation; and their physical wellbeing when taking action in the midst 
205 German, and Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? 
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of volatile and dangerous situations. Ultimately, it depends on each individual’s situation 
whether to act and/or respond to help prevent or interrupt domestic terrorism attacks. 
The intention of this thesis is to draw attention to the evolving threat of domestic 
terrorism, encourage Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of 
Homeland Security, fusion centers and local law enforcement to focus more on this threat 
and promote collaboration among these agencies and community engagement to address 
this threat. This can be accomplished with implementation of the above 
recommendations, the careful consideration of the challenges concerning the public’s 
participation and risks, and production of additional comprehensive reports and studies 
on the domestic terrorist threat. Unlike the current situation of researchers and terrorism 
experts who are primarily studying and writing about the threat within the United States 
from Islamic extremists, future literature should focus on the threat from all extremist 
groups, Islamic and non-Islamic, and especially the lone wolf terrorist. 
As recommended above, further research and comprehensive evaluations of both 
the National Network of Fusion Centers and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative are needed. There has not been a comprehensive study of the 
programs’ successes and impacts in combating domestic terrorism. It is not known how 
often the current process produces leads and reports that initiate further investigations 
and, ultimately, disrupt terrorist plots. Is the information being collected significant? Is 
the information compiled, analyzed, and shared in the most efficient manner? Are the 
disseminated reports being used in the information-sharing environment as intended—to 
combat domestic terrorism? 
The recommended changes proposed as a result of this research will influence 
future research efforts. Additional research will be necessary on the standardization of 
domestic intelligence agencies, including fusion centers, in terms of domestic terrorist 
threat intelligence requirements, collection methods, indicators, and warnings. Relative to 
intelligence collection, concerns about and possible solutions to violations of privacy 
rights and civil liberties must be further explored. Since lone wolf terrorists have been 
identified as the most successful and dangerous type of terrorist, what are the most 
effective methods for mitigating this threat? Also, best practices for how the public can 
89 
be more engaged in the war on domestic terror should be evaluated and implemented. 
Finally, as demonstrated in the statistics and incidents discussed in this thesis, there are 
many steps in the radicalization process and a nagging question concerning what is the 
driving force(s) that makes people shift from strong-minded activists to radicalized, 
violent extremists. 
The proposed national CT doctrine should involve a long-term, multi-faceted 
approach to combating violent domestic extremists, homegrown violent extremism, and 
radicalization in the homeland. A CBS News poll, conducted in October 2014, showed 
that current anti-terrorism policies make the general public feel less safe now than in mid-
2013.206 In response to this concern, a multi-disciplinary working group should be 
established to implement the above recommended activities, culminating in a 
comprehensive national CT doctrine. As a result, the general public would realize a 




206 “Terrorism,” 2014, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm   
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